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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

AN AGE OF DOUBT

Americans throughout the nineteenth century believed that
the phenomenal growth and prosperity of their nation had de
pended upon two basic factors:

the seemingly inexhaustible

supply of fertile, resource-laden lands to the West, and, to
exploit those Western riches, an ever-increasing population,
including welcome additions of immigrants from Europe,

Dur

ing most of their history, Americans had greeted newcomers
from Europe hospitably.

They not only assumed that their

nation, as an experiment in individual freedom, should serve
as an asylum for the oppressed of the Old World, but they
also realized that the country needed able-bodied and con
scientious immigrants for its destined expansion across a
virgin continent.

Even if Americans looked at times with

scorn upon the apparently ignorant character of many of the
nineteenth-century immigrants, they nevertheless believed
that the immigrants provided the brawn necessary to comple
ment the brains and capital supplied by native-born citizens
in the march across the Western wilderness.

As long as open

lands remained in the West, Americans could not feel crowded,
and they welcomed any additional aid that they might receive
for their task of subduing their land.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Americans
suddenly began to realize that their supply of land in the
West was not inexhaustible.

Throughout the 1880's and 1890's

a wide variety of spokesmen warned the American public of the
imminent disappearance of the nation's free public lands.
The famous prediction included in the 1890 census report, of
course, and Frederick Jackson Turner's renowned 1893 essay on
"The Significance of the Frontier in American History" were
the most dramatic examples of this danger signal.

But long

before the 1890' s other Americans had begun to discuss the
coming exhaustion of the Western lands and the ominous future
that such a process could bring to the American republic.
With one of the factors that had created the nation's
growth disappearing, many Americans of the late nineteenth
century began to argue that the other-large-scale immigration--could no longer be welcomed as a benefit to the country.
With the continent subdued, with opportunities for homesteads
in the West continually decreasing, some Americans suggested,
further immigration could only be a burden.

That the nation's

first extensive campaign for immigration restriction occurred
at the same time as the nation began to worry about the end
of the frontier was more than coincidence.

Although it was

not the only or, by any means, the most significant factor
in the drive for restriction, the belief in the exhaustion
of the public lands provided a powerful impetus to the crusade
for immigration restriction that arose in the late nine
teenth century.
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Lord Bryce, the British historian and politician and a
perceptive observer of the American nation at the end of the
nineteenth century, provided one of the more coherent discus
sions of the way in which the disappearance of the frontier
might affect American society.

In his influential study of

The American Commonwealth, first published in 1888, Bryce
suggested that the United States possessed three great ad
vantages that protected it from the problems disturbing
Europe:

a general lack of class distinctions; widespread

diffusion of wealth and property among the population; and
relative freedom from poverty and economic distress, because
of the abundance of economic opportunity in America, with
"the still unoccupied or undeveloped West providing a safety
valve available in times of depression."*

But, Bryce warned,

those advantages, and with them the security and prosperity
of the United States, were threatened by two influences:

the

increasing tide of immigration to America, and the impending
exhaustion of the Western lands.

Just as mysterious fog-

banks endanger a ship in the ocean, Bryce observed, the coming
exhaustion of the public lands presented to America "a time
of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may lie concealed whose
form and magnitude she can scarcely yet conjecture."

The

*James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (2nd ed., rev.;
2 vols.; London and New York: MacMillan and Co., 1890),
p. 716.
2Ibid., pp. 716-717.
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disappearance of the nation's best land would lead to a rise
in food prices and a harsher struggle for existence; more
significantly, it would end the outlet for population that
the West had provided, drive people more and more into cit
ies, and there increase the problems of labor competition
and pauperism,

"In fact," Bryce declared, "the chronic

evils and problems of old societies and crowded countries,
such as we see them to-day in Europe, will have reappeared
3

on this new soil."
Bryce also noted in his monumental work that the West
had always been the part of the United States most free from
the corruptions of Europe, and that immigrants who settled
in the West, through a continual process of isolation and
hard work, shed their old customs and ties and became more
attached to American society.

But as the frontier dis

appeared, that process, too, was threatened.

According to

Bryce, the final exhaustion of the public lands might not
occur for another thirty years, but when it did come a huge
series of problems would beset the United States:
c
be a time of trial for democratic institutions."

"It will

Lord Bryce was only one of the many authors who, in the
last two decades of the nineteenth century, called attention
to the dangers presented by the passing of the public lands.

3Ibid., p. 717.
4Ibid., p. 697.
5Ibid.. p. 717.

s

He was not, furthermore, an active participant in the cam
paign for immigration restriction.

His brief reference to

the closing of the frontier in The American Commonwealth,
however, is significant because it demonstrates all of the
major themes that tied the exhaustion of the public lands
to the cause of restriction.

Not only did Bryce connect

immigration and land exhaustion as the two factors threat
ening American institutions, but he also described specif
ically how the two factors intertwined.

The disappearance

of the frontier ended the possibility of rural settlement
on cheap homesteads for immigrants, and drove them into
cities.

It removed America's traditional labor safety valve,

and meant that immigrant labor competition would lower Amer
ican wages.

Finally, it eliminated the pioneering life by

which immigrants had been assimilated into true American
society.

These themes were reiterated continually throughout

the 1880's and 1890's by many Americans who claimed that the
closing of the frontier provided one reason for an immediate
reduction in immigration to the United States.

The belief in the disappearance of the frontier and the
campaign for immigration restriction appeared at--and were
themselves a product of--a time of profound psychological
crisis for the United States.

In the 1880's and 1890's

Americans sensed that the values and ideals that they had
always cherished suddenly were dissolving within a flood
of change.
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There is in all the past [wrote Henry George
in 1883] nothing to compare with the rapid
changes now going on in the civilized world
. . . . And that the rapid changes now going
on are bringing up problems that demand most
earnest attention may be seen on every hand.
Symptoms of danger, premonitions of violence,
are appearing all over the civilized world.
Creeds are dying, beliefs are changing; the ,
old forces of conservatism are melting away.
Americans had always believed that theirs was a society of
prosperity and opportunity, but in the late nineteenth cen
tury they felt the effects of large-scale depression, partic
ularly in the years after 1893, and they witnessed mass
unemployment, poverty, and slum conditions in the cities.
They had always believed that their society was free from
the class conflict that plagued Europe, but in the 18801s
and 1890*s they fearfully watched the growing strength of
trade unionism, felt the bitter attacks of Henry George and
Thorstein Veblen, and noted the rising discontent of im
poverished farmers.

They had always maintained faith in

the perfection of their democratic institutions, but now they
saw those institutions mocked by urban boss governments and
threatened by the appearance of socialists and anarchists.
They had believed that America could be a land free from
violent industrial labor conflicts, but suddenly they heard
of the railroad strikes of 1877, the Haymarket Square riot
of 1886, the Homestead Strike of 1892, the Pullman Strike of

Henry George, Social Problems, in The Complete Works
of Henry George, II (New York: Doubleday Page and Company7
'1904), pp^ 6-/7
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1894, and dozens of other examples of labor unrest.

In 1894

Americans even had to consider the meaning of an '‘army" of
some five hundred men, led by the reformer Jacob S. Coxey,
marching upon the Capitol of the United States and demanding
federal relief programs to combat the depression.

The psy

chological impact of all this on Americans was devastating,
and produced at the end of the nineteenth century what one
historian has called a transition period from an age of con7
fidence to an age of doubt.
The most basic aspect of the rising mood of doubt in the
United States was the country’s rapid transformation into an
urban-industrial society, with all of the dislocations pre
sented by such a change.

Industrialization meant that the

old Jeffersonian concept of a nation of yeoman farmers no
longer could apply to the United States,

By 1890 American
Q
industry produced more wealth than did American farms, and

the urban-industrial future of the country had become a fact.
Americans increasingly were leaving their farms and heading
for jobs in the cities.

Moreover, those farmers who remained

were by no means prosperous, contented Jeffersonian yeomen.
They were improverished and oppressed by the forces of agri
cultural depression and the vagaries of a new world-wide
?Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpreta
tion of American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 47-48. See, Tn par
ticular, all of Chapter II: pp. 41-54.
^Gilbert C. Fite, The Farmers' Frontier 1865-1900 (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 223-224.

s

agrarian market, and their discontent coalesced into polit
ical demands for basic changes in the American economic and
social structure.
The doctrine of the closing of the frontier conformed
perfectly to the general mood of doubt in the late nineteenth
century, and the statements of Turner and others received a
wide hearing among the American public.

Indeed, the fear of

the exhaustion of the public lands was a- basic part of the '
transition from an agrarian nation to an urban-industrial
society.
Although it is by no means true that the frontier simply
ended in the 1890's--in 190G there were still some 560 million
Q
acres of land available under federal land laws --most of the
better, more arable lands of the West had fallen into private
hands by that time.

More significantly, Americans of the late

nineteenth century sincerely believed that their frontier was
disappearing, and the belief profoundly frightened them.

The

closing of the frontier would bring to Americans final proof
that their agrarian democracy was evaporating, and that the
renowned pioneer spirit was vanishing from the United States.
Accordingly, many Americans in the 1880's and 1890's desper
ately sought ways by which they could alleviate the distress
that must face the nation when the frontier was gone.
Q
E. Louise Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain;
Disposal and Reservation Policies 1900-50 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 3-4.
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Such a goal involved, in one direction, a search for new
frontiers to conquer.

This could take the form, domestically,

of active participation in the "strenuous life" advocated by
Theodore Roosevelt or, internationally, of seeking foreign
markets for American industry and t r a d e . I n another direc
tion, it involved a search for new measures by which the
United States could preserve the virtues that formerly the
frontier had provided.

The pioneer life, Americans believed,

had always promoted democracy, individualism, nationalism,
and the formation of a composite American character.

With

the frontier gone, new and more artificial means of protect
ing those qualities Had to be devised, such as an additional
lOFor contemporary suggestions of the need to open up new
frontiers through overseas expansion, see Josiah Strong, Ex
pansion Under New World-Conditions (New York: The Baker and
Taylor Company, 1900), pp. 27-43; and Frank Norris, "The Frontier
Gone at Last," The World's Work, III (February, 1902), pp. 17281731. Walter LaFeber has shown that American expansionism of
the 1890’s was not a sudden effect of the closing of the fron
tier, but rather the culmination of the foreign policy and in
dustrial transformation of the entire post-Civil War period.
According to LaFeber, the industrial revolution in the second
half of the nineteenth century brought to America an era of
economic surplus, depressions, and labor violence, and the
United States tried to solve these social and economic prob
lems through a policy of foreign expansion. This was not ex
pansion in terms of a colonial empire, but rather an economic
expansion based on a need to acquire new markets for America's
industrial surpluses. LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpreta
tion of American Expansion 1860-T8§& (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1963), pp. 1-61, 407-417. Although LaFeber
denies that there was any direct cause-and-effect relationship
between the closing of the frontier and the expansionism of
the 1890's, he does agree that Americans of the period be
lieved that there was a connection: "But there can be no doubt
that one important part of the rationale for an expansive
foreign policy in the 1890's was a fervent (though erroneous)
belief held by many American [sic] that their unique and beneiicient internal frontier no longer existed." Ibid., p. 64.
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and more positive role for government in guaranteeing equality
of opportunity.

Another means by which the old frontier

characteristics could be preserved, many Americans announced,
was to eliminate one of the forces that now threatened those
characteristics:

immigration.

Immigrants, many Americans believed, had become more of
a threat to American institutions with the frontier disappear
ing, because they contributed to most of the problems connected
with the loss of the public lands.

With Western homesteads

unavailable, immigrants crowded into cities and increased the
problems of crime, pauperism, and corrupt urban governments.
With the Western safety valve gone, immigrants had to seek jobs
in Eastern factories, where they competed with native-born
workers, drove down wages, and aroused labor discontent.
Their radical and socialist views, Americans claimed, promoted
unionism, strikes, and labor violence.

Furthermore, the immi-

grants--especially the newer ones from southern and eastern
Europe--did not assimilate into American society, largely be
cause the Americanization process provided by the frontier had
vanished.

With these fears in mind, leading Americans of the

late nineteenth century found that the closing of the frontier
provided a potent reason for halting further immigration.

In the 1880's and 1890's, then, two general fears--those
produced by the increasing tide of immigration and by the loss
of the public domain--combined in a drive to restrict European
immigration.

This aspect of the movement for restriction dom
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inated the period roughly from 1882, when Congress passed
the first general law regulating immigration, to 1897, when
President Cleveland vetoed a bill designed to reduce immigra
tion substantially by means of a literacy test.

During that

period the fears caused by the closing of the frontier were
most immediate and most influential in the American mind.
During that time, leading American restrictionists--and
three men in particular:

Josiah Strong, Francis Amasa Walker,

and Richmond Mayo-Smith--made effective use of the frontier
theme in their arguments against immigration.

Large-scale

restriction, of course, did not appear until Congress devised
the quota system in the 1920*s.

By that time, however, racial

fears and the general mood of disillusionment following World
War I were more important factors behind restriction.

The

frontier theme was most prominent in the campaign during the
years when Americans believed that the frontier was disappear
ing, at the end of the nineteenth century.
T.he closing of the frontier, obviously, was only one
of the influences affecting anti-immigration sentiment in
the 1880's and 1890's.

Resentment of labor competition, fear

of radicalism from abroad, the urban crisis, the huge increase
in immigration following 1880, and especially prejudice against
the "new" immigration all combined as important factors in the
movement.

It is, however, a significant fact that sentiment

in favor of restriction rose to such a height in a period when
Americans for the first time expressed anxiety about the loss

12

of their public lands, and the fear of the disappearance of
the frontier permeated many of the arguments for restriction
presented in the periodical literature of the era.

CHAPTER II
THE FIRST FEAR:

IMMIGRATION

"There is land enough in America for the inhabitants of
all Europe," declared the politician and orator Edward Everett
in a speech on immigration in 1852, a sentiment with which
most Americans agreed for the following three decades.^

The

United States had, in fact, looked favorably upon immigration
from the very beginning of its history as a nation; one of
the grievances that the authors of the Declaration of Inde
pendence had directed against the King of England had been
that he obstructed the immigration of foreigners to the col
onies.

Resentment of immigrants had appeared at times in

the early years of the republic, such as the prejudice against
Irish Catholics in the 1830*s or the Know-Nothing movement in
the 1850’s, but those incidents had resulted primarily from
religious bias and were not, by any means, widespread and
perdurable movements throughout the nation.

Through the

Civil War era and beyond, the country still believed in its
obligation, as a haven of liberty, to welcome the oppressed
masses of Europe, and it furthermore sought the assistance of

^■Quoted in Edith Abbott, Historical Aspects of the Immi
gration Problem: Select Documents (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1926), p. 625.
13
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immigrants in subduing the continent.

2

Americans often declared that immigrants supplied the
muscle, while native-born citizens provided the "headwork,"
needed to develop the land.

Immigrant labor aided in the

construction of railroads and canals, provided needed man
power in young industries, and supplied much of the unskilled
labor that the country required.

Above all, Americans wel

comed the aid of immigrants in pushing the agricultural
frontier further and further west.

With a huge and nearly

empty continent of arable lands, the nation accepted all
the help that arrived at its shores.
It will be seen at once [an American declared
in 1855] that we have plenty of land yet un
occupied, and that there is no danger as yet
of crowding one another . . . . It is not sur
prising that, while we have so much land, which
it is utterly impossible for us to use or
occupy, the crowded population of Europe should
annually send off immense numbers to find a home
in the western world, where there is so much
room for them, and such ample accommodations.
We are glad that they come. We would welcome
them and give them on our soil a free and happy
home.3
The United States government, on the basis of similar senti
ments, often encouraged immigration through the middle years
of the century.

In 1864 the Senate committee on agriculture

^For much of the material of this chapter, I am indebted
to John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativism 1860-1925 (2nd ecL; New York; Atheneum. 1965]: and
Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: The Uni
versity of Chicago Press, I960) .
”
3A. Woodbury, "The Moral of Statistics," New Englander.
XIII (1855), pp. 189-191; quoted in Abbott, Historical Aspects
of the Immigration Problem, p. 810.
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formally noted the benefits of immigration in developing the
land and mineral resources of the nation,

4

and in the same

year the Republican party declared its support for an open
immigration policy:

"Foreign immigration which in the past

has added so much to the wealth, resources and increase of
power to this nation’•-the asylum of the oppressed of all
nations--should be fostered and encouraged by a liberal and
just policy."5
Western states and territories, in particular, actively
encouraged immigration throughout the 1860's and 18 70's.
Many states created immigration agencies to promote foreign
settlement in their open agricultural areas.

The agencies

advertised widely in the East and in Europe, published maps
and pamphlets to lure immigrants, and even sent representa
tives abroad to stimulate migration.

Minnesota, Wisconsin,

and Iowa were especially successful in enticing settlers from
Scandinavia and Germany, and states actually competed against
one another for potential settlers.

Western railroads, in

addition, directed an extensive land promotion campaign toward
immigrants.

Not only did the railroad companies hope to sell

the lands that they had acquired through federal land grants,
but they also needed settlement along their western routes to
provide future freight business.

Accordingly, the railroad

^Quoted in ibid., pp. 346-348.
5Quoted in William S. Bernard, ed., American Immigration
Policy: A Reappraisal (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat
Press, 1950), p . 6.
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companies offered special long-term payment policies to immi
grants who purchased their lands, and offered, as well, reduced
passenger fares to those lands.

Some companies even built

churches and schools for new communities in the West in order
to encourage settlement.

Individual land speculators, West

ern editors, and local boosters, along with the states and
railroads, all energetically promoted immigrant settlement
of the West at a time when the frontier lands appeared to be
6

inexhaustible.

Most immigrants in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, it is true, did not settle as farmers in the West.
Many thousands of Britons, Scandinavians, and Germans did
migrate to Midwestern agricultural areas, but other immigrant
groups tended to congregate in the cities of the United States.
Many immigrants of the period were unskilled workers, not
farmers, and lacked the capital and knowledge necessary for
agriculture in the West.

A general sense of economic oppor

tunity, not specifically the promise of free lands, had
7

attracted them to America.

Nineteenth-century Americans,

^Fite, The Farmers* Frontier, pp. 24-29; Jones, American
Immigration, pp. 187-190. For a more extensive treatment of
the efforts of Great Plains states to attract immigration,
the roles of state immigration bureaus, and promotional ad
vertising of this era, see David M. Emmons, Garden in the
Grasslands: Boomer Literature of the Central Great Plains
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), p p . 50-59,
99-127, and passim.
7
Folke Dovring, "European Reactions to the Homestead
Act," Journal of Economic History, XXII (December, 1962),
pp. 462-464; Jones, American Immigration, pp. 210-216.
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however, did not always grasp such knowledge so readily
available to twentieth-century historians.

To them, immi

grants were beneficial because they did appear to settle on
Western farms and further the development of the continent.
Moreover, immigrants who settled in the East often replaced
American farmers who moved West, and in that way they con
tributed to the general westward expansion of the nation.
During the 1860‘s and 1870*s, therefore, most Americans
were confident of the material growth of their nation and
regarded immigration as an aid to that growth.

They actively

encouraged immigration to the West, and maintained a faith
g

in the assimilative powers of the nation as a melting pot.
By the beginning of the 1880’s, however, Americans began to
question the long-accepted benefits of immigration.

A con

tinually growing tide of immigration, a rise in labor unionism
and unrest, the growth of urban problems, and, above all, a
change in the source of immigrants all combined to create, in
the minds of Americans, a new and widespread fear of immigra
tion.

Early in 1891 the superintendent of police in New Orleans
was murdered.

8

Suspicion immediately centered around the local

Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 14-23. Higham notes
that some materialistic Americans even assigned a monetary
value of up to $1000 or more to each immigrant, as an indi
cation of the value he brought to the nation: ibid.. p. 17.
See also Emmons, Garden in the Grasslands, pp. 47-50.
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community of Italian immigrants, many of whom were believed
to have connections with a secret group known as the Mafia.
The local authorities brought several Italians to trial for
the crime, but the jury refused to convict a single one.
The citizens of New Orleans suspected bribery, and decided
that they would have to enforce justice themselves.

On the

night of March 14, 1891, a mob composed primarily of leading
businessmen of the city burst into the prison where those
accused of the crime were being held and lynched eleven
Italians.

The prison officials did nothing to stop the

deed, and the local press of New Orleans applauded the ac9
tion.
Two months later, Representative Henry Cabot Lodge of
Massachusetts, in an article for The North American Review,
discussed the meaning of the incident for the American public.
Lodge announced his disapproval of the mob action, of course,
but declared that the real significance of the deed went far
beyond the issue of a mere act of violence.

Americans were

a peaceful and law-abiding people, Lodge noted, and "such
acts as the killing of these eleven Italians do not spring
from nothing without reason or provocation."

With a rather

obscure bit of logic, Lodge proceeded to show that the immi
grants had died because of the fact that they had been there;
that is, their mere presence in the United States aroused
uncontrollable fears and destroyed the normal lawful conscience
9Ibid., pp. 90-91; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Lynch Law and
Unrestricted Immigration," The North American Review, CLII
(May, 1891), pp. 602-612.
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of the American people.

The existence, Lodge argued, of

masses of illiterate and potentially criminal immigrants in
American cities--classes of people who might possibly con
tribute to the rise of such dangerous societies as the Mafia-in itself undermined the system of local government in the
United States, created widespread fear of violence and crime,
threatened the American standard of living, and destroyed
the natural equanimity of the American people.

The blame

for the Italians* deaths, Lodge observed, lay with the United
States

government for allowing them to be in the country

in

the first place.
I believe that, whatever the proximate causes of
the shocking event at New Orleans may have been,
the underlying cause, and the one with which
alone the people of the United States can deal,
is to be found in the utter carelessness with
which we treat immigration to this country.
Lodge, therefore, demanded stricter controls over immigration
to prevent such scenes from occurring again.1®
Other Americans of the time saw the New Orleans incident
as an argument for further restriction of immigration.

"The

New Orleans massacre of Italians has made more prominent than
ever the question of restriction on immigration," noted E. L.
Godkin in The Nation, and he went on to suggest that only
immigrants who could speak English should be admitted to the
United States.11

A writer in the Political Science Quarterly

IQlbid.
11[E. L. Godkin], "The Proper Sieve for Immigrants,"
The Nation, LII (April 16, 1891), p. 312.
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referred to the “disorder1* as “an alarm-bell'* that should
awake the nation to the dangers of a foreign population in
12
its midst,
and throughout the country the event contributed
to a mood of anti-immigration hysteria.

13

The New Orleans incident, therefore, was not only sig
nificant as one example of mob violence in the late nine
teenth century; it was also an example of the pervasive
fear of immigration that had appeared in the United States
by the 1880's and 1890's.

The episode dramatized the social,

economic, and political fears by then held by Americans
toward immigrants, and it furthermore indicated how those
fears were most often directed against the “new** immigrants
from the southern and eastern parts of Europe.

By the last

two decades of the nineteenth century, more Americans than
ever before opposed immigration; to them, it seemed that
immigration now menaced the social, political, and moral
stability of the republic.
Widespread fear of immigration began in an era when
immigration to America had risen to proportions never before
reached.

By the 1880's vast improvements in communication

and transportation, leading to cheaper and easier steamship
travel across the ocean, provided greater opportunity for

12

John Hawks Noble, “The Present State of the Immigra
tion Question,'* Political Science Quarterly, VII (June, 1892),
p. 232.
13

Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 91-92.
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emigration from Europe.

Instead of a crossing that took from

one to three months, steamships now made possible a ten-day
14
voyage to America at any time of the year.
Steamship com
panies, competing with one another, actively promoted immi
grant travel to the United States and offered attractive
fares for a voyage to the land of opportunity.

Americans

of the time suddenly found themselves burdened with what
they called "the great gulf-stream of humanity which sets
from Europe upon America---the greatest migration of peoples
since the world b e g a n . B e g i n n i n g in the 1880*s, the sheer
force of numbers from abroad frightened Americans.
Americans, however, were more afraid of what those num
bers could mean to the future of American institutions.

The

arrival of hordes of immigrants aroused great fears concerning
all aspects of American society.

14

Economically, the immigrants

Jones, American Immigration, pp. 183-185.

■^Henry George, Social Problems, p. 20. A special com
mission created by Congress in 1891 to investigate the causes
of immigration to the United States issued a lengthy, twovolume report of its findings. The five commissioners, re
porting separately, disagreed somewhat on the major reasons
for emigration from Europe, but all emphasized the general
hope for a higher standard of living and increased economic
opportunity. Some of the commissioners believed that immi
grants usually decided to move through the letters and infor
mation they received from friends and relatives already living
in America. Other commissioners, however, emphasized the
importance of steamship company promotion, contract labor
agreements, and fraudulent advertising in enticing immigrants
to the United States. U.S., Congress, House, A Report of the
Commissioners of Immigration Upon the Causes Which Incite
Immigration to the United States, House exec, doc. 235,
52nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1&52, Vol. I, pp. 120-123, 235-237,
248, 263, and passim.
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seemed to endanger the high standard of living and the bar
gaining power long enjoyed by the American worker.

"Immigra

tion,'* wrote Richmond Mayo-Smith in 1888, "subjects the laborer
of America to a stress of competition such as no laboring class
1f
in the world has ever been called upon to endure."
Immi
grant labor competition, Americans shouted, would end high
wages in the United States.
Politically, Americans viewed mass immigration as a
threat to democracy.

Ignorant new voters, with no experience

in or knowledge of the responsibilities of self-government,
could overturn the American electoral system.

Moreover, they

could easily fall victim to the corrupt influences of dema
gogues and urban bosses.

"There is no corner of our system,"

E. L. Godkin argued, "in which the hastily made and ignorant
foreign voter may not be found eating away the political
structure, like a white ant, with a group of natives standing
over and encouraging him,"

17

Immigrants posed a further po

litical threat, many Americans believed, because they often
brought with them anarchism, socialism, and other radical
18
doctrines.
l&Richmond Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration. IT,"
Political Science Quarterly, III (June, 1888), p. 223.
■^[E. L. Godkin], "The Harm of Immigration," The Nation,
LVI (January 19, 1893), p. 43. For similar views of the political fears aroused by immigrants, see Hjalmar H. Boyesen,
"Dangers of Unrestricted Immigration," The Forum, III (July,
1887), pp. 532-542; and Noble Canby, "Immigration," The
Chautauquan, XVI (November, 1892), pp. 197-201.
18
Although it was true that immigrants provided a high
percentage of the trade union members and leaders in America,

23
European immigration continues [Lord Bryce
wrote] , and though more than two-thirds of
the immigrants make valuable citizens, the
remainder, many by their political ignorance
and instability, some few by their proneness
to embrace anti-social doctrines, are a source
of danger to the community, lowering its tone,
providing material for demagogues to work on,
threatening outbreaks like those of Pennsyl
vania in 1877, of Cincinnati in 1884, of
Chicago in 1886.19
Mass immigration, the citizens of the United States began to
fear after 1880, menaced the political stability of the nation.
Socially, the immigrants aroused an even greater fear.
To a large extent, this was because of the way in which they
congregated in the cities of the country.

The immigrants

lived by themselves in urban areas, organized by nationality,
speaking their own languages, following their native customs,
and refusing to become “Americans.'*

They often established

their own schools, churches, and newspapers.

They lived in

the most degraded slum conditions, and, Americans claimed,
increased the levels of crime, poverty, disease, illiteracy,
and insanity.

Accordingly, they placed a financial burden upon

the local taxpayers and endangered the security of the commun
ity.

But the greatest social fear, as one author indicated,

as well as many of the more radical leaders of the late nine
teenth century, and although nativists always linked immigra
tion with political radicalism, most immigrants were actually
very conservative. Their European tradition of accepting the
existing state of things, their loneliness and confusion in
America, their fear of change and belief that change could
only make matters worse, and their ties to the past and the
ideals of their homeland all tended to make immigrants socially
and politically conservative. See Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951), pp. 108-110; and Jones,
American Immigration, pp. 229-232.
19gryce, The American Commonwealth, p. 716.
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was the one based on the simple fact that the immigrants were
‘•different":

"The danger which threatens us is the growth of

a large foreign element in our population whose habits of
thought and behavior are radically different from those which
the founders of the nation hoped to establish here,"

20

This

fear arose in the 1880*5 and 1890*s directly in response to
the so-called "new" immigration from southern and eastern
Europe.

Americans had always been accustomed to an immigration
consisting of the English, Germans, and Scandinavians--AngloSaxon peoples from the northern and western parts of Europe.
Those immigrants had been similar in traditions, customs, and
religions to the native-born citizens of the United States,
and they had assimilated easily into American society.

Amer

icans could tolerate and welcome them readily; after a while,
they found that they could tolerate even the Irish immigrants.
Around 1880, however, driven by political and religious dis
content and the economic dislocations caused by industrialism
and agricultural depression, a rising tide of immigrants
began arriving in the United States from such places as
Austria, Hungary, Russia, Italy, Turkey, and Rumania.

These

"new" immigrants by no means replaced the older immigration
from northern and western Europe, but they did appear in ever20

p . 232.

Noble, "The Present State of the Immigration Question,"

25
increasing numbers throughout the 1880es and early 1890's.

21

The new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe
frightened most Americans by the fact of their difference.
They were, in general, poorer and less educated than any class
of immigrants who had come before them.

They were, moreover,

generally Roman Catholic or Jewish, thus arousing hostility in
a Protestant nation.

Furthermore, they seemed to aggravate all

the political, economic, and social dangers that Americans as
sociated with immigration.

They were, for the most part, un

skilled workers who increased labor competition and drove down
wages.

They were ignorant of democratic political institutions.

They lived in crowded slum conditions in the nation's cities.
Above all, they looked different; they were not Anglo-Saxons,
Americans claimed, they were members of a different race.

22

With the arrival of the new immigrants in the 1880's
and 1890's, Americans began a storm of hysterical criticism.
Senator William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, one of the

21

For a convenient table of European immigration figures
throughout United States history, see The Statistical History
of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present
(Stamford, Conn.: Fairfield Publishers, n.d.), pp. 56-57.
22
Jones attacks the validity of the whole notion of a
"new" immigration, claiming that these immigrants came in the
same patterns and for the same reasons as all earlier waves of
immigrants: American Immigration, pp. 3-5, 178-183, 192-193.
It is nevertheless true that native-born Americans of the late
nineteenth century believed sincerely in the idea of a new im
migration, and reacted on the basis of that belief.
It is
also true, from a historical viewpoint, that immigration from
the nations of southern and eastern Europe did increase dras
tically in the 1880's.

26
earlier Congressional leaders in the restriction movement,
complained that the nation was now receiving "the very worst
class of immigrants.

They are illiterate, coarse, and

stupid^-utterly unfit for residence or citizenship in the
23
United States."
Chandler’s colleague Henry Cabot Lodge
made the issue his most consistent political theme in the
late nineteenth century.2^

Francis Amasa Walker, a leading

lay spokesman for the cause of restriction, filled his writ
ings with hostile references to the "shiftless peasants" and
the "foul and stagnant pools of population" that were drain
ing off from southern and eastern Europe into the United
States.

There was no reason, Walker exclaimed, why the

country should have to accept persons who obviously repre
sented "the utterest [sic] failures of civilization, the
worst defeats in the struggle for existence, the lowest
25
degradation of human nature."
Countless others joined in the denunciations.

A writer

in The Chautauquan complained of "those nationalities in the
south and eastern part of Europe which have not held their
own in the race struggle" dominating the recent arrivals in
the country.

"These hordes are of an inferior type," he

23Wm. E-. Chandler, "Methods of Restricting Immigration,"
The Forum, XIII (March, 1892), p. 129.
2^See, e.g., Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Restriction of Immi
gration," The North American Review, CLII (January, 1891),
pp. 27-36.
^Francis Amasa Walker, "Immigration," The Yale Review. I
(August, 1892), pp. 131-135; Walker, "Immigration and Degrada
tion," The Forum, II (August, 1891), pp. 643-644.
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continued, "least capable of understanding our institutions,
or adapted to responding to the opportunities and privileges
of a free government."

76

The labor leader Terence V. Powderly

agreed: "The population which came previous to 1860 was civi
lized, that which comes to-day is, in a great proportion,
semi-barbarous.”

27

Everywhere Americans protested the fact

that the new immigrants did not assimilate into Anglo-Saxon,
Protestant society, claiming that the new immigration "is
not related to us in race or language, but has habits of
thought and behavior radically foreign to those which have
so far prevailed in the United States.

These facts are too

potent to be missed and too significant to be disregarded."

28

Many Americans of the period did not disregard such
"facts."

The first of the great fears of the 1880’s and

1890's--that of immigration--motivated many influential
leaders to campaign for some type of control over the rising
tide of immigrants, and resulted in the first series of
federal laws restricting immigration.

Nativist sentiment, of course, to some extent had been
present in America ever since the first wave of settlers began
26Canby, "Immigration," p. 199.
^ T . V. Powderly, "A Menacing Irruption," The North
American Review, CXLVII (August, 1888), p. 166.
OQ
[J. H. Noble], "The New Immigration," The Nation,
LIII (September 17, 1891), p. 210.
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to consider themselves true " A m e r i c a n s B e f o r e the 1880's,
however, nativism specifically directed against immigration
had reached significant proportions only sporadically.

Most

early forms of nativism, moreover, had appeared as part of
fears that went beyond mere resentment of immigrants.

The

early colonial laws aimed at the restriction of some types
of immigration had often stemmed from hostility toward r e 
ligious and economic differences, not from any real race or
nationality prejudice.

In the 1790's, bitter political

rivalries had influenced the passage of the Alien and Sedi
tion Acts by the Federalists, measures designed in part to
halt the admission of alleged alien radicals whom the Fed
eralists feared.

Antagonism directed against the Irish in

the 1830's and 1840's had been largely a result of religious
bias against Catholics and fears of a papal plot against
American democracy.

The Know-Nothing movement, which became

powerful enough to control some states in the middle 1850's,
had not called specifically for immigration restriction, but
more for excluding immigrants from participating in politics.
The movement, furthermore, disappeared quickly in the midst
of the more significant sectional conflicts in the 1850's;
and, like all early nativist campaigns, it never really captured the support of a majority of the American public.

29

By the 1880's, however, the increasing social, economic,

29
Jones, American Immigration, pp. 39-176, passim.
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and political fears aroused by the new immigration, and the
ever-expanding numbers of immigrants, produced a new wave
of anti-immigration sentiment, and one that affected a siz
able portion of the American public and that revealed
specific demands for a federal restriction of immigration.
Americans from varied backgrounds and interests began to
agree on the necessity of reducing immigration.

Labor leaders

and organizations campaigned against the labor competition
30
that unrestricted immigration created.
Urban reformers of
the late nineteenth century resented the problems of poverty
and crime that immigrants seemed to intensify in the cities.
Protestants continued to alert the public to the growing
strength of the Catholic church in America as immigrants
swarmed to the country.

Americans reacted hysterically to

the labor violence of the late 1880's and 1890's by increas
ing their demands for restriction of the immigrants who seemed
to cause the conflicts.

Above all else there were the racial

fears against the new immigrants.

What, in general, arose

from the tensions of the period was the first widespread and
31
long-lasting American movement against immigration.

^American labor generally favored restriction of immi
grants specifically induced to America as contract labor, be
cause of its fear of competition. Because American unions,
however, included so large a percentage of foreign-born members
and leaders, labor usually opposed sweeping limitations on
voluntary immigration: Higham, "Origins of Immigration Restric
tion, 1882-1897: A Social Analysis," Mississippi Valley His
torical Review, XXXIX (June, 1952), p p . 80-81.
31j©nes, American Immigration, pp. 252-258; Higham,
"Origins of Immigration Restriction," pp. 78-84.
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The mood of fear created, in the 1880’s and 1890's, a
series of local and national nativist societies throughout
the United States.

Many patriotic and fraternal organizations

began to endorse the principle of restriction.

The American

Protective Association, founded in Clinton, Iowa, in 1887 byHenry F. Bowers, called for restriction of Catholics, but the
32
group withered away by the late 1890's.
More important and
influential was the Immigration Restriction League, organized
in 1894 by a group of young Boston Brahmins who resented the
rising power of foreign elements in America, their own loss
of status, and the weakening numerical strength of the AngloSaxon race in New England.

For twenty-five years the League

issued pamphlets, organized speeches, lobbied in Congress,
and in other ways campaigned vigorously for a reduction in
immigration.

33

The various restrictionists and their societies in the
late nineteenth century announced their support for specific
measures by which the nation could stop the flow of immigra
tion, but there was never universal agreement upon what
measures would be most effective.

"There is an almost uni

versal feeling in favor of greater restrictions than the
law now imposes," declared Senator William E. Chandler in
32
33

Jones, American Immigration, pp. 255-256.

Barbara Miller Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A
Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1956), pp. 99-111 and passim.
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1893, "but there is no unanimity of opinion as to what the
new restrictive measures should b e . " ^

Chandler favored a

system of consular certificates, whereby any prospective
immigrant, before sailing to the United States, would obtain
a certificate from an American consul attesting to his bene
ficial qualities and character, and indicating that he would
not place an additional burden upon the American taxpayers.
Others proposed various types of head taxes, by which only
immigrants who could afford to pay a certain sum upon landing
could settle in the United States.

33

Others declared that

only those who could speak English should be admitted, since
they could adapt easily to American political institutions.

36

A general test of literacy in any language became, in the
1890's, probably the most popular idea regarding restriction.
Edward Bemis, a Johns Hopkins economist, first proposed the
37

measure in 1888 in an article for the Andover Review.

The

Immigration Restriction League appropriated the idea and made
it one of its basic campaign doctrines.

Prescott F. Hall,

an original founder and secretary of the League, declared that
there was a distinct correlation between illiteracy and crime,
poverty, and violence, so that the literacy test measure would

34

W. E. Chandler, "Shall Immigration be Suspended?", The
North American Review, CXLVI (January, 1893), p. 4.
35
See, e.g., Walker, "Immigration," pp. 139-141.
36
[Godkin], "The Proper Sieve for Immigrants," p. 312.
37
Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, pp. 78-79,
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exclude easily all undesirable immigrants from the country.
Hall even suggested that the plan was a perfect one because
the Statue

of Liberty held a torch in one hand and a book

in the other!

38

For these and other similar measures, re-

strictionists waged an extensive campaign at the end of the
century.
Such a campaign implied that the federal government had
the responsibility of enacting some type of controls over
immigration, and by the late 1880’s immigration bills had
become a frequent aspect of Congressional business.

Immi

gration restriction had become as well a major issue in po
litical campaigns.

In an 1891 survey of "The Political Issues

of 1892,11 Henry Cabot Lodge noted that, along with silver
coinage, the tariff, election reform and the civil service
system, "there is, besides, a question of a widely different
kind which ought perhaps to be considered in any enumeration
of the probable issues of next year.
of immigration."

This is the question

Lodge went on to suggest that the restric

tion issue was receiving more and more attention and was
becoming "the gravest subject before the American people."

39

By the 1890's restriction was a leading doctrine of the Repub
lican party, with Senators Lodge and Chandler organizing the
38

Prescott F. Hall, "Immigration and the Educational
Test," The North American Review. CLXV (October, 1897),
pp. 400-401. See also Noble, "The Present State of the
Immigration Question," pp. 238-243.
3Q
Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Political Issues of 1892,"
The Forum, XII (September, 1891), pp. 104-105.
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campaign in Congress. The Democratic party in general was
less enthusiastic about restriction, because it contained
more foreign-born members, but in 1892 the Republicans,
Democrats, and Populists all issued platform statements
calling for some type of controls over immigration.40

In

the closing years of the nineteenth century immigration
restriction became a prominent social and political concern
of a wide segment of the American public.

This concern about immigration, and the profound fears
aroused by immigrants, produced in the 1880's and 1890*s the
first significant series of federal immigration laws.

The

measures passed often proved ineffective, and they were only
minor acts compared to the sweeping immigration laws of the
twentieth century, but they were nevertheless an important
indication of the dominant fears of the late nineteenth cen
tury.
Although Congress had enacted a few measures concerning
immigration earlier, the first general federal immigration
law was passed in 1882.4^" That act gave the Secretary of the

40
Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion
1890-1900 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 5.
4^For brief surveys of the immigration legislation of
the 1880’s and 1890's, see Roy L. Garis, Immigration Restric
tion (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1927), pp. 83-1161
r
Marion T. Bennett, American Immigration Policies: A History
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), passim; and
Bernard, ed., American Immigration Policy, pp. 1-21. Garis
is generally in favor o f restriction, Bernard calls for a

34
Treasury supervision over immigration, and excluded certain
categories of immigrants from landing in the United States:
convicts, idiots, paupers, lunatics, and all persons likely
to become a public charge.

The law of 1882 also decreed a

fifty-cent duty on all aliens entering the country, with the
money acquired to be used for the expenses of inspecting
the immigrants and for a relief fund for some of the arrivals.
The measure was a weak one, and proved almost impossible to
enforce; an immigration inspector in New York, for example,
was unable to determine immediately which immigrants might
be paupers or likely to become public charges.^
Also in 1882 Congress passed the first Chinese exclusion
act, the beginning of a series of measures aimed directly
against oriental immigrants.

Then in 1885, in an attempt

to solve the problem of labor competition from European immi-

more liberal policy, while Bennett's work is simplistic and
poorly written. Another survey of the early legislation can
be found in a volume of the Dillingham Commission report:
U.S., Congress, Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission:
Immigration Legislation. S. Doc. 758, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess.,
19117 pp. 29-81. The latter work also reprints all the laws
passed prior to 1911: pp. 95-126.
42

A Congressional committee appointed in 1890 to inves
tigate the effectiveness of the law of 1882 and other immi
gration measures noted, in its report, that the port of New
York had only five immigration clerks, who were so hurried
in the inspection procedure that they could devote only
thirty seconds of time to each immigrant. Under such con
ditions, the committee declared, "it is manifest that the
inspection is wholly inadequate." V. S., Congress, House,
Report of the Select Committee on Immigration and Naturali
zation, House report 34V2, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1891,
p. iii.
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grants, Congress passed the Foran Act, or the Contract Labor
t

Act.

Enacted partly in response to demands from organized

labor, the measure prohibited the importation of any alien
already under a contract to work in the United States, and
it voided all contracts, signed by aliens prior to their land
ing.

Exempted from the provisions of the law, however, were

actors, singers, musicians, artists, domestic servants, and
skilled workmen in new industries.

Such exemptions, and the

general difficulty of proving that a prior contract may have
43
existed, made the Foran Act nearly impossible to enforce.
The next major piece of immigration legislation was a
law of 1891, which added new categories to the 1882 lists
of excluded persons:

polygamists and those "suffering from

a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease."

More impor

tantly, the 1891 measure established a permanent federal
administration in charge of immigration, and it created a
series of federal inspection officers in all major American
ports, thus allowing more vigorous enforcement of restric
tion laws.

The act also compelled steamship companies to

return, at their own expense, all passengers rejected for
admission by the inspection officers; this provision forced
the companies themselves to act as immigrant inspectors on
the other side of the Atlantic.

44

43jones points out, in addition, that very few manufacturers in the post-Civil War period had actively encouraged
contract labor in the first place: American Immigration,
pp. 190-191.
44
Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 99-100.
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The measures of 1882, 1885, and 1891, even when properly
enforced, excluded only a small percentage of the thousands
of immigrants seeking entrance to the United States in the
late nineteenth century.^

They did not, therefore, satisfy

most of the spokesmen for restriction.

In the 1890's the

restrictionists began to band together in an extensive cam
paign for a harsher law:

the literacy test bill, which was

directed specifically at the "new" immigrants.

Henry Cabot

Lodge began promoting the idea as early as 1891, and in 1895
he presented such a bill to the Senate.

Lodge's bill would

have prohibited all aliens over the age of fourteen who could
not read and write some language from entering the country.
Congress finally passed the measure in December, 1896, but
President Cleveland vetoed the bill just before leaving
office in 1897.

Cleveland charged that the proposed law

would keep out beneficial as well as undesirable immigrants,
and he noted, furthermore, that the measure was inconsistent
with America's traditional image as a haven for the oppressed
46
of the world.
Attempts to revive the literacy test bill
were numerous throughout the early 1900's, but such a measure
was not enacted until 1915.

Immigration legislation in the

45The laws, in addition, could not stop excluded immi
grants from entering the country across the Canadian border,
where there was no system of inspection.
^Excerpts from Cleveland's veto message are reprinted
in Edith Abbott, Immigration: Select Documents and Case
Records (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp.
198-201.
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1880's and 1890's, in general, remained diluted and sporadic.

The significant fact about the federal immigration leg
islation of the 1880*s and 1890's, however, was that for the
first time it existed.

A rising fear of immigration in the

late nineteenth century' contributed to the passage of federal
restriction laws, and, more importantly, to a widespread
public campaign against immigration.
American nativism, John Higham has suggested, always
arose as a defensive form of nationalism, and only at times
when Americans were losing confidence in some aspect of their
way of life.^

When, in the 1880*s and 1890*s, tremendous

new social, economic, and political pressures weakened Amer4

icans' confidence in their institutions, fear of immigration
appeared.

At the same time a second great fear grasped the

attention of the nation: the impending exhaustion of the pub
lic lands.

When the two fears met, Americans began to ques

tion seriously whether the right of immigration might not be
"an abstract theory for whose sake we are sacrificing the
great advantage of our elbow-room and risking our national
character."

48

The combination of the two fears threatened,

both elbow-room and the national character, and that com
bined threat could only serve to intensify the already-existing
demands for immigration restriction.

^Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 4-5.
48
Noble, "The Present State of the Immigration Question,"
p . 243.

CHAPTER III
THE SECOND FEAR:

THE CLOSING OF THE FRONTIER

When Frederick Jackson Turner announced to the "World's
Congress of Historians and Historical Students" assembled at
the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1892 that "the frontier
has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of
American history,"1 he was not saying anything new.

As Theo

dore Roosevelt wrote to the young historian in 1894, Turner
actually had only "put into definite shape a good deal of
2
thought which has been floating around rather loosely."
Turner clarified and popularized in an academic context the

^Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American His
tory (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920, 1947), p. 38.
2
Quoted in Ray Allen Billington, America's Frontier
Heritage (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1966), p . 13.
For a general discussion of the background to Turner's hy
pothesis, see ibid.. pp. 4-13, as well as Billington, Fred
erick Jackson Turner: Historian. Scholar. Teacher (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 108-131. Also valuable
are James C. Malin, "Space and History: Reflections on the
Closed-Space Doctrines of Turner and MacKinder and the Chal
lenge of Those Ideas by the Air Age," Agricultural History,
XVIII (April, 1944), pp. 65-74; Herman Clarence Mixon,
"Precursors of Turner in the Interpretation of the American
Frontier," South Atlantic Quarterly. XXVIII (January, 1929),
pp. 83-89; and Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American His
torical Writing Reconsidered (New York: the Free Press.
1960), pp. 79-89.
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importance of the frontier and its closing, but he admittedly
had appropriated many of his ideas from an already existing
body of opinion.

The Italian economist Achille Loria had

demonstrated the importance of the availability of free land
to political institutions, and had suggested in the 1880's
that the future exhaustion of lands in the United States
3

would lead to widespread social unrest.

More importantly,

large numbers of Americans themselves throughout the 1880's
and 1890's had begun to express anxiety about the impending
disappearance of the frontier.

Their ideas had helped to

create, in the late nineteenth century, a widespread American
fear that the future of the United States was seriously
threatened by the closing of the public domain.
A wide variety of Americans‘--government officials, re
nowned authors, educators, private citizens--expressed their
fears about the coming end of the frontier in the late nine
teenth century, and the theme appeared frequently in the
periodical literature of the era.

As early as 1880 The Nation

noted the danger: "The great progress of this country has
taken place within the past twenty years, owing to the rapid
settlement and cultivation of Western lands; and we have been
going on as if there were to be no exhaustion of the impelling
force."

But, the editorial continued, the land was rapidly

disappearing: "At the present rate of settlement the desir3

Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, pp. 121-123;
Benson, Turner and Beard, pp. l-4o.
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able free ’homestead' lands will probably all be occupied
before this decade has e n d e d . A

special Land Commission

Report of 1880 gave official notice to the idea.
It was estimated, June 30, 1879, that (exclu
sive of certain lands in the Southern States)
of lands over which the survey and disposition
laws had been extended, lying in the West, the
United States did not own, of arable agricul
tural public lands, which could be cultivated
without irrigation or other artificial appli
ances, more than the area of the present State
of Ohio, viz., 25,576,960 acres.5
A few years later Thomas Donaldson’s immense statistical
analysis of The Public Domain echoed the warning.

There

was a large quantity of desert lands still available in the
West, Donaldson stated, and many lands suitable only for
mineral or timber use, but "the agricultural lands are now
about absorbed, and the movement westward in search of free
government lands must soon cease.
The fear mounted throughout the 1880’s.

"It has never

seemed to occur to [the nation] that a day would come when
there would be no public domain to give away," announced a
special reporter for The North American Review in 1886.

But

through ineffective land laws, through huge grants to rail-

^"An Agricultural Outlook," The Nation, XXXI (August 19,
1880), p. 127.
^Quoted by Thomas P. Gill, "Landlordism in America,"
The North American Review, CXLII (January, 1886), p. 60.
^Thomas Donaldson, The Public Domain (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1884) , p. 27.
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roads and speculators, through a false optimistic belief
that the nation’s riches would last forever, the government
had squandered nearly all of its lands.
It is no longer a question of untold millions
of acres of public domain.
It is no longer a
question for to-morrow, it is a question for
to-day. The pressure has already come. For
all practical purposes of bestowing free farms
on its growing population, the public domain
of the United States is now exhausted.7
One month later another writer in the same magazine repeated
the warning.

"Considering the great wealth of public domain

which Uncle Sam had at the outset it is amazing to contemplate
the brief period in which he has squandered his estate," the
author noted.

But, he went on, it was unfortunately true

that there were very few arable acres remaining in the West,
and it "seems clear that by the end of the century we shall
have no public lands open for cultivation."

Both writers

were particularly concerned that many of the Western lands
had fallen into the hands of private speculators and absentee
landlords, thus raising the price of land, destroying the
ideal of a small homestead, and creating a landlord-tenant
system in the United States.
The notes of alarm continued into the early 1890's.
C. Wood Davis, writing in The Country Gentleman in 1891,
asked what the closing of the frontier might mean to the
nation.
_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

^Gill, "Landlordism in America," pp. 52-60; quotes from
pp. 54, 60.
®A. J. Desmond, "America’s Land Question," The North
American Review, CXLII (February, 1886), pp. 187, 138.
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When we reflect that the prime factor in the
unexampled prosperity of the United States,
and our comparative freedom from many of the
social and economic problems long confronting
Europe, has been the existence of an almost
unlimited area of fertile land to which the
unemployed could freely resort; that, prac
tically, such lands are now fully occupied,
and that such occupancy has occasioned a
sudden halt in the westward movement of pop
ulation at the line found to the extreme
western limit of profitable agriculture, it
may be well to inquire what changes are likely
to result from the exhaustion of the tillable
portion of the public domain.^
F. H. Newell, writing in Science in 1893, indicated that most
of the Western land suitable for agriculture had already been
appropriated: "At the present rate of disposal of public lands
it is a question of only a few years when every available acre
will be t a k e n . B y

the time of Turner’s famous essay, a

profound fear concerning the future of the nation without its
public lands already had arisen in the United States.^

Henry George was probably the most important writer of
the 1880's to warn of the imminent exhaustion of the public
Q
Quoted in Benson, Turner and Beard, p. 80.
H. Newell, "Our Vacant Public Lands," Science, XXI
CApril 14, 1893), p. 199.
““
“
^ N o t everyone believed that the closing of the frontier
would be a disaster. C. Wood Davis, for example, thought
that the exhaustion of the public lands would bring a rise
in agricultural prices and prosperity, while J. Willis Gleed,
a Kansas lawyer and real estate promoter, suggested in The
Forum that land values would rise as the frontier disappeared:
Benson, Turner and Beard, pp. 58-63, 65-66.
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domain.

Land was the basic component of George’s entire

economic theory, and to George the problem of the disappear
ance of the public lands involved the rise of a landlord
class who controlled those lands and the consequent division
of American society into social classes.

The dangers pre

sented by the loss of the frontier, according to George,
threatened the very stability of American civilization.
As early as 1871 George noticed that relatively little
good, arable land remained free of private control in the
United States.

In Our Land and Land Policy he announced

that if one deducted from the total acreage of the public
domain the lands that had been lost through railroad grants,
lands covered by water, mountains, and desert, and dry plains
land unfit for agriculture, the nation contained only the
relatively small figure of 450 million acres of profitable
12
farm land.
Accordingly, he warned, the public domain
could not last so long as the end of the century:

MIn fact,

if we go ahead, disposing of it at the rate we are now doing,
it will not begin to last so long, and we may even count upon
our ten fingers the years beyond which our public lands will
13
be hardly worth speaking of.”
The loss of the public domain was a tremendously serious
matter to George, because he saw individual, privately-owned
12

Henry George, Our Land and Land Policy, in The Complete
Works of Henry George, VIII (New York: Doubleday Page and
~
Comp any, 19 04j , p p . 3 -5.
13Ibid. , p. 8.
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homesteads as a basic component of American society.

In

his most celebrated work, Progress and Poverty, published
in 1880, George closely forecast Turner’s later remarks
about the role of frontier settlement as a determinant of
American character.
This public domain---the vast extent of land
yet to be reduced to private possession, the
enormous common to which the faces of the
energetic were always turned, has been the
great fact that, since the days when the first
settlements began to fringe the Atlantic Coast,
has formed our national character and colored
our national thought . . . . The General intel
ligence, the general comfort, the active inven
tion, the power of adaptation and assimilation,
the free, independent spirit, the energy and
hopefulness that have marked our people, are
not causes, but results--they have sprung from
our unfenced land. This public domain has
been the transmuting force which has turned
the thriftless, unambitious European peasant
into the self-reliant Western farmer . . . .
All that we are proud of in the American char
acter; all that makes our conditions and insti
tutions better than those of older countries,
we may trace to the fact that land has been
cheap in the United States, because new soil
has been open to the emigrant.14
Such a beneficial trait of -the frontier, George warned, would
disappear as all of the public lands passed into private
hands--especially into the hands of large speculators and
landowners.

Already the best lands in the country had been

appropriated by the railroads and other private interests,
leaving only mountain and desert land available:
fact which has been so potent is ceasing to be.

"The great
The public

l^George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the
Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with
Increase of Wealth: The Remedy; Works, I. pp. 387-388. For
a similar statement, see George, Social Problems, p. 21.
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domain is almost gone--a very few years will end its influ
ence, already rapidly failing.
America’s most urgent problem, George therefore declared,
was to eliminate land monopoly, an evil that became more
sinister as the public lands disappeared.

Land monopoly, he

suggested, was the source of the widespread discrepancy in
wealth in America, and of the problems of industrial depres
sion as well.

Since land was the ultimate source of all

wealth, labor must have access to land in order to find
opportunity and produce wealth.

But land monopoly, particu

larly that involving speculation, allowed much of America’s
land to lie unused, and thus destroyed access to opportunity
and upset the nation’s economy.

The problem became more

acute as the previously free lands of the West disappeared
into private hands, eliminating access to wealth to an even
greater extent.
George’s solution to the problem, of course, was a simple
one:

the single tax on land.

The government should, in

effect, make land common property by abolishing all taxes
except those on land values.

This system would force land

owners either to make profitable use of their land or to sell
it to someone else who would; no one could afford to hold
land idle for speculative purposes.

The single tax thus would

reinstate access to economic opportunity, and, in addition,
overcome the difficulties presented by the loss of the public
domain.

l^George, Progress and Poverty, pp. 388-389.
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Henry George, as a realistic observer, was not worried
that all of the Western lands were about to be consumed.

He

only feared that they were being appropriated~-"fenced in”-by private speculators, thus removing America’s traditional
1f%
unit of Western settlement, the cheap homestead.
To George,
as well as to many other Americans of the late nineteenth
century, the final exhaustion of the free public lands seemed
close at hand, and such a circumstance would occasion vast
and unwelcome changes in the pattern of American society.

From a twentieth-century viewpoint, it is easy to demon
strate that the frontier really did not close in 1890 or at
any other time near the end of the nineteenth century.

The

nation actually disposed of more land under its homestead
laws after 1890 than it did prior to that year, and in 1900
one-fourth of the entire country was still available under
17
various land laws.
It is, nevertheless, significant that
a major portion of the arable homestead lands in the West--

■^See, e.g., Social Problems, pp. 24-25.
17
Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, p. 2; Fred
A. Shannon, "The Homestead Act and the Labor Surplus," Amer
ican Historical Review, XLI (July, 1936), pp. 637-651; Peffer,
The Closing of the Public Domain, pp. 3-4. David Potter has
further suggested that the closing of the frontier is a mean
ingless concept, because as early as the middle of the nine
teenth century urbanism and industrialism had replaced the
frontier as the principal source of economic abundance in
the United States: People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and
the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1954) , pp. 158-160.
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lands that could be cultivated profitably without irriga
tion-had been appropriated by the turn of the century.
Mostly desert and mineral lands remained available under the
nation's land laws in 1900, and the wild land rushes into
Oklahoma in 1889 and the Cherokee strip in 1893 indicated
that the public was feeling some type of land pressure by
that time.^8
More important is the fact that many Americans of the
late nineteenth century sincerely believed that their longcherished frontier was passing.

By the 1890's the pioneer

life had practically entered into the realm of nostalgia,
and Americans expressed deep anxiety about what such a
condition meant to the future of their institutions.

Many

concluded that the loss of free lands had caused the depres
sion of the 1890's, and could see only widespread poverty
and unrest in a frontierless future.

19

The exhaustion of the public lands, therefore, was a
real fear to Americans of the era.

Predictions as to when

the last acre of the public domain would disappear varied,
but not widely.

Lord Bryce gave the most optimistic esti

mate in 1888, setting the date as "not more than thirty
years ahead."

20

At the other extreme, The Nation declared

l^Fite, The Farmers' Frontier, pp. 215-216; Faulkner,
Politics, Reform and Expansion, pp. 2-4; Peffer, The Clos
ing of the Public Domain, pp. 3-4, 9.
19Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, pp. 108-109.
20

Bryce, The American Commonwealth, II, p. 717.
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in 188 0 that the last arable homesteads would be taken up
by the end of the decade, and The North American Review
announced in 1886 that the frontier, for all practical
purposes, had already perished.

21

Henry George, Josiah

Strong, and most other observers agreed that the end of
the century would provide the magic date.

To a large seg

ment of the American public, the fear of the exhaustion of
the Western lands was a real one and an ominously imminent
one.

To Americans who fearfully pondered two of the prev
alent fears of the late nineteenth century--the fear of
immigration and the fear of the closing of the public
domain---the two combined and pointed to an important assump
tion.

With America’s public lands disappearing, many rea

soned, immigration must be restricted.

A campaign against

immigration would have materialized on its own in the 1880’s
and 1890’s, simply as a result of the fears engendered by
the "new" immigrants.

But the closing of the frontier,

occurring at the same time, intensified these fears and
strengthened the restriction movement.

Writers in leading

periodicals of the era combined the two themes, and ex
plained that the simple loss of space in the country, the
disappearance of the frontier safety valve, and the end of
the assimilative influences of the pioneering process all
21"An Agricultural Outlook," The Nation, p. 127; Gill,
"Landlordism in America," p. 60.
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meant that the United States no longer could afford to admit
a vast number of immigrants.

The argument was an effective

one to a public concerned about both of the fears.

chapter

IV

RESTRICTION AND THE LOSS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
To many of the spokesmen for immigration restriction,
the impending exhaustion of the public lands provided a
simple and direct reason for the necessity of reducing the
flow of immigrants to the United States.

The decline of

open lands, obviously, indicated that the nation was nearly
filled with settlers and no longer needed an artificial in
crease in its population.

With most of the arable lands of

the West under cultivation, there was no further demand for
able-bodied immigrant laborers and farmers to help push
back the frontier and hasten the growth of America.

The

frontier had already been pushed back, and the nation now
should preserve those few lands that remained for the use
of its own native-born citizens.'1' The United States,

This theme was a predominant one in the attack on alien
landownership, which, though not directly a part of the cam
paign against immigration, showed some aspects of the connec
tion between the loss of the frontier and hostility against
foreigners. A letter-writer to the New York Tribune in 1881
was one of the first to use this theme directly. Discussing
the declining opportunities for American citizens in the late
nineteenth century, he decried the fact that foreigners were
grabbing too many of those opportunities, such as the remain
ing land: "The nation has reached a point where its policy
should be to preserve its heritage for coming generations,
not to donate it to all the strangers we can induce to come
among us." (New York Tribune, July 2, 1881, p. 5. Quoted
in Higham, Strangers in the Land, p. 38.) Opposition to
50
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restrictionists claimed, no longer could afford to admit a
stream of immigrants who could contribute only to the over
crowding of the land.
All of those who argued for restriction agreed that in
the earlier days of the republic immigration had been a
benefit"-”in fact, a necessity--te the growth of the nation.
In an 1891 article calling for restriction, Henry Cabot
Lodge, at that time a representative from Massachusetts,
heartily agreed that the earlier American policy of en
couraging immigration had been “a wise and obvious course
to pursue."
The natural growth of the people established
in the thirteen colonies was not sufficient
to occupy or develop the vast territory and
valuable resources of the Union. We there
fore opened our arms to the people of every
land and invited them to come in, and when

alien landholding became increasingly vociferous through the
1880‘s and early 1890*s, and alien landlords repeatedly were
condemned as a major source of the rising system of tenant
farming and other social problems of the West,
(See espe
cially George, Socla1 Problems, passim.) In 1887 Congress
passed a .law forbidding aliens who did not declare an inten
tion of becoming American citizens to purchase land in the
Territories.
In its report to the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Public Lands strongly recommended the pas
sage of the bill, announced that alien landownership was a
perversion of the original intent of the Homestead Act, and
indicated that the practice, if not halted, could cause the
quick disappearance of the Western lands: “At the present rate
of disposition this generation will see the last acre of pub
lic land worth taking for a home by a farmer disposed of."
(U.S., Congress, House, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., July 31, 1886,
Congressional Record, XVII, pp. 7830-7831.) The act of 1887
was aimed particularly at foreign absentee landlords who con
trolled lands in the United States, but it was nevertheless
part of the increasing concern about the role of foreigners
in the disappearance of the frontier. A spokesman for re
striction writing in 1890 noted the still-present concern of
the West with alien purchase of lands, as well as further
political demands for an end to the practice: Peri Ander,
“Our Foreign Immigration: Its Social Aspects," The Arena, II
(August, 1890), p. 269.
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all the region beyond the Alleghanies, or
even beyond the Mississippi, was still a
wilderness, the general wisdom of this
policy could not be gainsaid.
But, Lodge argued, the process of settling those vast lands
was now complete; a policy of unrestricted immigration must
now be considered harmful to the interests of the country.
We no longer have endless tracts of fertile
land crying for settlement. Many parts of
the United States, it is true, are still
unsettled, and much of our territory is
sparsely inhabited as compared to the stan
dards of Europe. None the less, the condi
tions have changed utterly from the days
when the supply of vacant land was indefinite,
the demand for labour almost unbounded, and
the supply of people very limited. We have
now a large population, the natural increase
of which is quite sufficient to take up our
unoccupied lands and develop our resources
with due rapidity.2
To Lodge, as to most other proponents of restriction, it
might have been true that some lands were still available
in the West.

But it was more important that those lands

were rapidly disappearing, and the United States should
initiate a policy of saving what remained for the use of
native-born Americans.

The nation, with its declining

lands, no longer could afford to serve as the haven for the
oppressed of the world, or as the hope of economic oppor
tunity for a horde of immigrants from Europe.

As one re-

strictionist declared, such ideas were in the late nine
teenth century only "vague and antique maxims" that applied

?
Lodge, "The Restriction of Immigration," pp. 32-34.

S3

when the nation was sparsely settled, but no longer.

3

The restrictionists feared the continuing influx of
immigrants even more when they realized that the loss of
the public lands meant that immigrants, with cheap farm
lands no longer available to them, would flock into the
nation's cities.

The presence of large numbers of foreign-

born residents in the cities of the East presented an
awesome problem to Americans of the late nineteenth cen
tury.

Urban immigrants, the restrictionists claimed, lived

in the midst of unbelievable poverty and squalor and in
creased the problems of crime, vice, and pauperism in the
cities.

They were a source of labor competition, and drove

down wages and the standard of living of native-born Amer
icans.

More importantly, they were a source of labor unrest,

radicalism, socialism, anarchism, and other threats to the
American political system.

With these fears in mind, fears

compounded by the closing of the frontier, restrictionists
accelerated their demands for immigration reform.
One of the first persons to connect the loss of public
lands and the consequent dangers of immigrants in cities was
the statistician Worthington C. Ford, who mentioned the
theme in an 1887 article for The Epoch.

Like other restric

tionists, Ford agreed that in previous eras, when a vast
amount of unoccupied land was open to the immigrant settler,
the nation could absorb easily the influx from abroad with^John Chetwood, Jr., "Immigration, Hard Times, and the
Veto," The Arena. XVIII (December, 1897), p. 798.
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out danger to American institutions or prosperity.

But

now, Ford declared, the problem of immigration had become
a vital one: "The exhaustion of the public domain has re
moved one of the best openings for the foreigner who has
no capital . . . [TJhe opportunities for the great mass
of unskilled laborers . . . are becoming less, and this
part of the immigration congregate in our cities, and,
unable to obtain a living or to move westward, fill our
charitable and penal institutions."^
Other restrictionists used the argument even more
vehemently, with frequent bombastic allusions to the polit
ical dangers of urban immigrants.

A writer in The Forum,

for example, declared that the disappearnce of profitable
homestead iand was increasing the threats posed by the
immigrants: "Our cities are filling up with a turbulent
foreign proletariat, clamoring for panem et circenses, as
in the days of ancient Rome, and threatening the existence
of the republic if their demands remain unheeded."5

A

few more realistic observers noted that the Western lands
were not all filled as yet, but that the immigrants were
crowding into the Eastern cities anyway.

Representative

Samuel W. McCall of Massachusetts, speaking before the
House in favor of the proposed literacy test bill in 1896,
4

Worthington C. Ford, "Regulating Immigration," The
Epoch, I (April 15, 1887), pp. 229-230.
5Boyesen, "Dangers of Unrestricted Immigration," p. 533,
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answered opposing arguments that there was plenty of land
still available for immigrants in Texas and other parts of
the West.
The great difficulty is that this particular
class of immigrants do not go to Texas, do
not go to our unoccupied territory, but they
settle down in our large cities, in our con
gested districts. They add to the labor
problems that are vexing them, and most of
them go into the dangerous slums of our
Eastern cities.6
To many restrictionists, however, it was, without a doubt,
the pressure of the closing frontier that was driving the
immigrants into the cities and increasing the problems of
the nation.

In the hands of effective restrictionists, the

loss of the public lands was a powerful argument for a need
to halt the flow of immigrants in the late nineteenth cen
tury.

Three influential spokesmen of the period, in particular,
used the frontier theme most effectively in awakening the
American public to what they saw as a vital need for immi
gration restriction.

One of these men, the Reverend Josiah

Strong, was enormously popular and influential with the
general Protestant reading public of the United States.

The

other two--Francis Amasa Walker, a distinguished economist
and the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech
nology, and Richmond Mayo-Smith, a noted Columbia University

bu.S., Congress, House, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., May 20,
1896, Congressional Record, XXVIII, p. 5477.
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political scientist-directed their appeals more often at
the scientific and intellectual community of the nation.
Together, these three men presented a powerful and dis
tinguished front for the cause of restriction, and they
influenced a major segment of the American public.

All

three used the frontier theme in their arguments against
immigration, although in widely different ways.

Their

fears were based really on something much more important
than the simple closing of the public lands, but in their
use of the frontier theme they all began with the belief,
as announced by o-ther spokesmen of the 1880’s and 1890’s,
that the exhaustion of the public lands was imminent, and
that such a danger provided a logical reason for a reduc
tion in immigration.
To Josiah Strong (1847-1916), the West was of vital
importance to the nation; indeed, the future of the West
would decide the future of America, and even the future
of mankind.

The closing of the Western lands, obviously,

would be a factor of grave significance in Strong’s scheme
of things.
Strong had spent a relatively short part of his early
career in the actual West.

A native of Illinois and a

graduate of Western Reserve College in Ohio, Strong with
drew from Lane Theological Seminary in Cincinnati in 1871
to accept a position as home missionary pastor of the Con
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gregational Church in Cheyenne, Wyoming.

7

He lasted in

that frontier community for only two years, trying to com
bat the saloons, gambling halls, and "disreputable houses"
of the town while guiding a church of some thirteen members.
This short career in the West, however, profoundly influenced
Strong, and was undoubtedly the source of many of his later
throughts about the imperative need to save the West for
Christianity.
In 1873 Strong returned to his alma mater, Western
Reserve, as chaplain and instructor in theology.

Two years

later he accepted a pastorship in Sandusky, Ohio, and in
the early 1880*5 he served as a regional secretary for the
Congregational Home Missionary Society.

In 1884 he became

the pastor of a large Congregational church in Cincinnati,
and it was while serving in that capacity that in 1885 he
published his first major book, Our Country; Its Possible
Future and Its Present Crisis.

The book perfectly mirrored

the thoughts of most nineteenth-century Protestant Americans,
7
For information on the life of Strong, see John Haynes
Holmes, "Josiah Strong,** Dictionary of American Biography.
XVIII (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), pp. 150151; Jurgen Herbst, editor’s introduction to Josiah Strong,
Our Country (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer
sity Press, 1963), pp. xv-xvi; Dorothea Rosalie Muller,
Josiah Strong and the Challenge of the City (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1955; Ann Arbor,Mich.: University
Microfilms, Inc., 1970), pp. 3-14; and Frank R. Grant, "The
Kingdom of God and the Crisis of America: An Interpretation
of Josiah Strong’s Thought’* (unpublished seminar paper,
University of Montana, 1970), pp. 1-13.

58
was an immediate bestseller, and made Strong a famous and
influential figure for life.

8

For the rest of his career

Strong served as one of the most powerful spokesmen for
applied Christianity and the social gospel movement, devot
ing most of his time and attention to the problems of the
industrial city.

After the success of Our Country he went

to New York as General Secretary for the Evangelical Alli
ance of the United States, and later himself organized and
directed other societies designed to combat problems of the
new urban age, duties upon which he concentrated until his
death in 1916.

The American public, however, always knew -

him mainly as the author of Our Country.
In many respects, the major theme of Our Country was
the significance to the nation of the coming exhaustion of
the Western lands, and Strong was one of the first major
writers of the late nineteenth century to tie that theme
directly to the problem of immigration.

9

To Strong, the

West was the area in which the destiny of mankind would be
determined within the coming decades.

The late nineteenth

century, he announced, was a momentous focal point in his8The first edition of the work sold at least 130,000
copies, and numerous other editions were issued. Sections of
the book were reprinted frequently in newspapers, magazines,
and pamphlets, and the work was translated into several for
eign languages: Herbst, editor’s introduction to Our Country.
p. ix; Josiah Strong, preface to Our Country (rev. ed.; New
York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1891), pp. 3-4.
9Higham says that the book was the first major attack
on immigration since the 1850*s: Strangers in the Land, p. 39,
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tory, second in importance only to the birth of Christ, and
an era that would determine the future of the human race.
Not only was the nineteenth century a time of dynamic changes
in communications and transportation, but, more significantly,
it was the period in which the last New World--the American
West— was being settled.

IQ

As the world's final frontier,

the lands of the West, according to Strong, could decide
man's fate.

With its vast resources, the West would be the
11
future home of millions.
America held the future of all
aspects of man's needs, from mining, manufacturing, and agri

culture to the concerns of the spirit.

The whole history of

mankind had been a continual progressive westward, until in
the closing years of the nineteenth century the movement had
reached its final destination.

"The West is to-day an

infant," Strong warned, "but shall one day be a giant, in
each of whose limbs shall unite the strength of many na~
12
tions."
It was, therefore, a concern of the utmost impor
tance that the American West, in its final years of settle
ment, be furnished with the proper form of Christian civili-

^Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and
Its Present Crisis (New York: The^American HomeMissionary7
Society, 1885), pp. 1-7. Strong reiterated the importance
of the late nineteenth century in most of his later works;
see, e.g., The New Era, or The Coming Kingdom (New York: The
Baker and Taylor Co., 1893), pp. 1-16.
■^Strong estimated that, with improvements in agricul
ture, the arable lands of the West could feed as many as
1,012,000,000 Americans! Our Country, p. 10.
12

Ibid.t pp. 7-29.

Quote from p. 29.
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zation, which to Strong meant Anglo-Saxon Protestantism.
The future of the West, however, and therefore of the
nation, was threatened by a number of sinister "perils"
gathering in the closing years of the century.

With a

chapter devoted to each of them, Strong described in con
siderable detail those perils, among them Romanism, Mormonism, intemperance, socialism, disparity of wealth, and the
problems of the city.

The one that he listed first, how

ever, and one that profoundly increased the dangers of all
13
the others, was the peril of immigration.
An army twice
as large as that of the Vandals and Goths who had destroyed
Rome, Strong announced, in recent years had invaded the
United States.

This influx of immigrants

seriously menaced

the future of American civilization, as such a huge foreign
element "must have a profound influence on our national life
and character" and accelerate "several of the most noxious
growths of our civilization."1^

The immigrants, especially

the typical "peasants" of the new immigration from southern
and eastern Europe, would lower the standard of morality in
the United States; they would increase the levels of disease,
vice, and debauchery; and they would threaten the political
institutions of the nation by falling prey to demagogues and
city bosses.

Moreover, immigrants could only increase the

1^Ibid., pp. 30-46.
l4

Ibid., p. 40.
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dangers presented by the other perils of the era, Strong
insisted.

They added to the ranks of Catholics, Mormons,

socialists, and anarchists* and they increased tremendously
the problems of the urban slums.

In short, immigration was

the first threat to American civilization.
The threat posed by immigration, Strong went on to
announce, was even more serious because of the impending
loss of the public lands in the West.

Based on the figures

of land sales in 1884, Strong calculated that all of the
arable lands in the West would be taken by the end of the
century,

15

a problem that made the peril of immigration an

immediate one.

For one thing, the end of the frontier would

drive the immigrants even more into cities (including the
new cities of the West), where they would increase the urban
problems to which they had contributed already.
If the growth of the city in the United States
has been so rapid during this century, while
many millions of acres were being settled,
what may be expected when the settlement of
the West has been completed? . . . . When the
public lands are all taken, immigration, though
it will be considerably restricted thereby, will
continue, and will crowd the cities more and
more.1®
^Ibid., pp. 155-156. In a work published at the turn
of the century, in 1900, Strong endorsed his own prediction:
"Practically, therefore, our arable public lands are exhausted "
Expansion Under New World-Conditions. pp. 19-21.
In this
work, Strong declared that the exhaustion of the lands was
one of the new conditions that made necessary American eco
nomic expansion abroad, especially to the tropics. For a
discussion of Strong's views in the context of the expan
sionism of the 1890's, see LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 72-80.
■^Strong, Our Country, p. 137.

62
More importantly, however, the potential settlement of immi
grants in what few lands remained in the West, at a time
when the West was to determine the destiny of mankind, posed
a serious threat to Strong's plans for the West.

The char

acter of any community or area, he proclaimed, was decided by
the character of its first settlers.

With the West about to

be settled permanently within the next fifteen to twenty years,
the pioneers who migrated there would determine, "for cen
turies to come," the destiny of the West and therefore of the
17
whole nation.
To Strong, the problem reduced itself to a
question of whether the West was to be Americanized or foreignized, and to him the choice was an obvious one.

The

nation could not afford to watch a stream of immigrants, with
their foreign religions, languages, and customs, populate the
West.

It should take steps to guard against the dangerous

influx of foreigners, and make certain that the West was
peopled by the proper civilization.

To Strong, that civili

zation meant Protestant members of the Anglo-Saxon race.
The Anglo-Saxon race, in Strong's view, represented m a n ’s
purest ideals of both civil liberty and spiritual Christianity,
and that race, therefore, should be responsible for the civil18
ization and evangelization of the world.
God obviously had
prepared the exhaustion of arable lands in the West as a means
of increasing population pressure in the world.

17Ibid., pp. 144-158.
18Ibid., pp. 159-163.

That pressure
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would lead to "the final competition of races,” and from
that competition the superior Anglo-Saxon race, of course,
would emerge victorious.

But as a means to that ultimate

victory, the Christians of the late nineteenth century should
open their eyes and realize the importance of settling the
West with the right kind of people--Protestant Anglo-Saxon
19
Americans, not immigrants.
With that important theme in
mind, Strong then, in the closing chapter of his book,
announced to his readers the ulterior motive that was actu
ally behind the whole work: a plea for contributions to the
Home Missionary Society, to help that organization bring the
proper types of civilization and Christianity to the West.
To Josiah Strong, then, the closing of the frontier and
the dangers of immigration combined to menace the future of
Protestantism and the Anglo-Saxon race in America.

Such a

threat obviously necessitated some type of a halt to the flow
of immigrants from Europe, especially those from southern and
eastern Europe.

Francis Amasa Walker also feared the possible racial
and social consequences of the influx of "new” immigrants-his writings on restriction abound with hostile references
to the "degraded peasants” finding their way to the United
States.

As a respected economist and educator, however,

Walker was more concerned with showing that immigrants in

19Ibid., pp. 174-180.
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the late nineteenth century no longer (and perhaps never had)
brought necessary benefits to the growth of the republic.
In demonstrations of this thesis, Walker made ample use of
the theme of the closing of the frontier.
Walker (1840-1897) led one of those fascinatingly varied
lives that, seemed to be common to many members of the late
nineteenth-century educated elite.

20

He was a member of an

old and distinguished New England family, the son
well-known economist Amasa Walker.

of the

Francis Walker went to

Amherst College at the age of fifteen, graduated in 1860,
studied law for a brief time, and then entered the Union Army.
By the age of twenty-five he was a brevet brigadier-general,
and he won praise as an efficient officer who emphasized the
necessity of precise military information.

Wounded and im

prisoned during the Civil War, with his health permanently
weakened, Walker left the army in 1865 and for a few years
taught Latin and Greek and wrote editorials for a Massachu
setts newspaper.

In 1869, his reputation for accurate

statistical information apparently still alive in govern
mental circles, Walker was appointed chief of the Federal
Bureau of Statistics, a position he filled, either officially
or unofficially, for the next several years.

20

Conscientious

For information on the life of Walker, see Jeannette
P. Nichols, "Francis Amasa Walker," Dictionary of American
Biography. XIX, pp. 342-344; George M. Fredrickson. The Inner
Civil War (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), pp. 202-205;
and Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, pp. 69-77.
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and thorough, Walker reorganized the bureau along more
scientific lines, and as superintendent of the censuses
of 1870 and 1880, he issued the most lengthy and precise
census reports yet published, an accomplishment that greatly
enhanced his reputation as a statistician.

Following a

brief term as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Walker in
1872 accepted an appointment as professor of political
economy at the new Sheffield Scientific School at Yale,
although he still maintained his connections with the Bureau
of Statistics until after the 1880 census.

In 1881 he be

came the second president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, a position he retained for the rest of his life.
Walker was the author of several major works on eco
nomics, and even though he criticized many of the established
laissez faire doctrines of late nineteenth-century conserva21
tism,
he was considered the most prominent and influential
American economist of his time.

His economic and statistical

theories relating to the development of the United States
have been identified as one of the influences on Turner's
formulation of the frontier hypothesis,
influence extended to Europe as well.

22

and his economic

As a distinguished

21-For a brief summary of Walker's economic views, see
Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization,
III (New York: The Viking Press, 1949) , p p . 101-110.
22

Billington, America's Frontier Heritage, pp. 9, 11;
Fulmer Mood, "The Development of Frederick Jackson Turner
as a Historical Thinker," Publications of the Colonial
Society of Massachusetts. XXXIV, Transactions 1937-1942
(Boston, 1943), pp. 306-307.
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statistician, economist, and educator, as a member of Boston
Brahmin society who knew the right people and belonged to
the right clubs, Walker was one of the most respected mem
bers of the educational community of the era.

His position

of respected leadership can perhaps best be indicated by
the fact that he received more honorary degress than any
other American of his time.

23

A man so honored undoubtedly would command great influ
ence as a spokesman for the cause of immigration restric
tion, a cause to which Walker devoted much of his attention
in the 1880’s and 1890's.

Like many other members of the

Brahmin aristocracy, Walker strongly believed that the immi
grants severely threatened the influence and status of his
class, and he repeatedly called for an end to unrestricted
immigration.

His major contribution to the campaign was to

demonstrate, in a statistical and scientific manner, that
immigration no longer could be considered a social and eco
nomic benefit to the nation, a major factor of this conclu
sion being the loss of the public lands.
Walker actually tried to show that immigration had never
been a blessing to the United States.

Rejecting the tradi

tional theory that immigrants previously had supplied man
power when the country needed it, Walker, in an 1891 article
for The Forum, a n n o u n c e d a radical new theory that he

^Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War, p. 203.
2^Walker, "Immigration and Degradation," pp. 634-644.
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continually emphasized for the rest of his life.

Using de

tailed statistical information, Walker “proved" that immigra
tion had contributed neither to the population increase, nor
the economic growth, of the nation in the nineteenth century.
He delcared that the birth rate of native-born Americans,
which had always been a high one, decreased drastically begin
ning around 1830 when large-scale immigration first became a
noticeable factor in the United States.

The low birth rate

of native-born Americans then had remained in effect ever
since that time.

Walker could only conclude that the influx

of foreigners, with their low standards of living, decency,
and morality and their added competition in the labor market,
"constituted a shock to the principle of population among the
native element."

25

In other words, terrified by the arrival

of "stagnant pools of European population, representing the
utterest [sic] failures of civilization, the worst defeats in
?A
the struggle for existence,"
native-born Americans stopped
reproducing at the rate to which they had been accustomed.
As a result, the immigration of the nineteenth century had
not added to the American population; it had merely replaced
native stock that otherwise would have appeared.

Consequently,

Walker could not consider even the earlier immigrants as eco27
nomic benefits to the country.

2^Ibid., p. 640.
26Ibid., p. 644.
27

For a contemporary attack on Walker's theory, see
[E. L. Godkin], "The Harm of Immigration," The Nation, LVI
(January 19, 1893), p. 43.
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To a public that generally believed that immigration had,
at least in the early years of the republic, provided some
kind of a service to the nation’s growth, Walker’s argument
could not be accepted completely.

Consequently, in many of

his other articles on immigration, Walker conceded that
immigration possibly could have been desirable in earlier
times.

But, he emphasized, the conditions of the late nine

teenth century, and particularly the disappearance of the
frontier, had now ended whatever need for immigrants might
28
have existed previously.
’’There was a time,” Walker declared in an 1892 article
for The Yale Review, ”a long time, when every able-bodied
man coming to our shores, however poor and even however
ignorant, if not vicious or criminal, brought or added
strength to the young nation.”
The more came [he went on], the more there
was for all and for each. A continent was
to be wrested from savage nature, was to be
annexed, occupied, cultivated, and every
one’s help was welcome in the great work.29
But around the middle of the nineteenth century, Walker con
tinued, Americans began to question the usefulness of immi28

Walker used this theme directly in "Immigration," The
Yale Review. I (August, 1892), pp. 125-145; and "Restriction
of Immigration," Atlantic Monthly. LXXVII (June, 1896),
pp. 822-829. For another article in which Walker emphasized
the changing conditions of the nineteenth century, but not the
frontier theme specifically, see "The Tide of Economic
Thought," Publications of the American Economic Association.
VI, Nos. 1 and 2 (January-March, 1891), pp. 15-38.
29
Walker, "Immigration," p. 126.
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gration.

Even more recently, Americans became seriously

alarmed by the influx of immigrants.

The earlier belief in

immigration as a source of wealth and power could apply no
longer in an era witnessing the loss of the public lands in
the West.
A generation or less ago, a vast extent of
free public lands offered to every new-comer
a home and a farm simply for the seeking. So
wide was the range of possible settlement that
the immigrant could scarcely go astray in his
seeking.
If not here, then there, lands of
excellent quality and easy of cultivation lay
open to his choice . . . . To-day, the tracts
of public land worth taking up under the home
stead and preemption acts are few and far
between. The crazy rush and the frenzied
struggles which attended the opening of the
Territory of Oklahoma, a few years ago, and
the opening of the Cherokee Reservation within
the past twelve months, afford striking testi
mony to the difference between the new and the
old state of things.30
Walker then announced his agreement with the prevalent fear
of the loss of the frontier forcing immigrants into the na
tion's cities: "Exhaustion of the free public lands makes
the resort to the soil far more difficult and costly; and
is having a marked effect in retaining an increased propor
tion of the new arrivals at the very ports of entry or in
sending them to swell the operative populations of our manufacturing towns."

31

Walker repeated his use of the frontier argument in
similar, but even more forceful, terms in an 1896 article in
the Atlantic Monthly.

Of the major new conditions that

3°Ibid., pp. 129-130.
31lbid., p. 130.
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necessitated a more restrictive immigration policy in the
United States, he listed in first position the loss of the
public domain.
First, we have the important fact of the com
plete exhaustion of the free public lands of
the United States. Fifty years ago, thirty
years ago, vast tracts of arable land were
open to every person arriving on our shores,
under the Preemption Act, or later, the Home
stead Act. A good farm of one hundred and
sixty acres could be had at the minimum price
of $1.25 an acre, or for merely the fees of
registration. Under these circumstances it
was a very simple matter to dispose of a large
immigration. To-day there is not a good farm
within the limits of the United States which
is to be had under either of these acts.32
The only possible solution to this problem, according to
Walker, was a drastic reduction in the number of immigrants
admitted.

His favorite plan for accomplishing this task in

volved a deposit of one hundred dollars to be paid by each
immigrant upon entering the United States.

If, after a

period of three years, the immigrant had demonstrated that
he was a self-supporting, law-abiding citizen, the government would refund his deposit.

33

The important point to Walker was that such a policy
would prevent the poorer and degraded peasants from southern
and eastern Europe from coming to the United States, but not
the more prosperous (and Anglo-Saxon) immigrants from Sweden,
Norway, and Germany.3^

32

Walker, in fact, was really much more

Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," p. 826.

33wal.ker, "Immigration," pp. 139-141.

34lbid,
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afraid of the "new11 immigrants, “shiftless peasants'* who
threatened American social, political, and industrial insti
tutions, than he was of the consequences of the closing of
35
the frontier.
He did believe, nevertheless, that the loss
of the public lands was one of the most important reasons for
the need to restrict immigration, and in the hands of such a
distinguished member of the academic community, the frontier
argument provided an especially powerful weapon against immi
gration.

Another distinguished political economist and educator
of the period, Richmond Mayo-Smith, presented probably the
most rational and least inflammatory appeals for immigration
restriction in the 1880's and 1890's,

Like the other major

restrictionists, Mayo-Smith made effective use of the notion
of the closing of the public lands, although on a much more
perceptive level than either Strong or Walker.
In contrast to Walker's wide range of activities and
careers, Richmond Mayo-Smith (1854-1901) led the duller,
T£
commonplace life of a typical college professor.
Descended
from seventeenth-century New England settlers, he was born
in Troy, Ohio, and grew up in Dayton.

As a member of a family

35

For an example of Walker's racial prejudices, see
ibid., pp. 130-135.
•^Information on Mayo-Smith's life comes from William
R. Leonard, “Richmond Mayo-Smith," Dictionary of American
Biography. XII, pp. 467-468; and Solomon, Ancestors and
Immigrants, pp. 77-78.
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who held traditional New England values, he naturally went
to college in New England, graduating from Amherst in 1875.
After two years of studying economics at German universities,
he began to teach political science at Columbia, where he
remained for the rest of his life.

His economic views, as

well as his ideas on statistics and immigration, were influ
enced by Walker.

Mayo-Smith became widely respected in the

academic community as an authority on economics and statis
tics, and was the author of various works on those subjects.
He was one of the original editors of the Political Science
Quarterly, founded at Columbia in 1886, and he frequently
contributed to that publication. After such a lackluster
and scholarly life, Mayo-Smith finally managed to make the
front page of the New York Times in 19G1 when he jumped to
his death from the window of his fourth-floor study.

Oddly

enough, he was on his sabbatical at the time.^
As a spokesman for immigration restriction, Mayo-Smith
showed much less of an emphasis on racial fears than did
either Strong or Walker.

He definitely was disturbed by

the masses of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe,
as almost all Americans in that era were, and he was admittedly
hostile to Chinese immigrants and American Negroes.

38

But he

37

“Columbia Professor Killed by a Fall,” New York Times,
November 12, 1901, p. 1.
38

See, e.g., Emigration and Immigration: A Study in
Social Science CNew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904),
pp. 64-65, 247-248. The work was originally published in
1890.
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did not dwell on those racial fears as did many other restrictionists of the late nineteenth century.

Instead,

Mayo-Smith emphasized the social and economic aspects of
immigration, the results of increasing labor competition
and the threat that the immigrants posed to the American
standard of living.

The closing of the frontier provided

one major ingredient to his discussion of such topics.
Mayo-Smith*s first major contribution to the literature
of restriction, and his first use of the frontier theme,
came in a three-part article that he wrote for the Political
39
Science Quarterly in 1888.
Like other restrictionists,
Mayo-Smith agreed that immigration had been a benefit to
the young United States, a welcome addition to the labor
force of an under-populated and expanding nation.
The whole history of this country, of course,
has been one of colonization and immigration.
The original need was for labor . . . . The
task which lay before the original settlers
was immense.
There was in front of them to
be subdued a wilderness three thousand miles
wide, covered with primeval forest, unbroken
by roads and even u n e x p l o r e d . 40
The natural increase of American population alone could not
have supplied the manpower necessary to conquer that wilder
ness in a short period of time, so "that with our immense
unoccupied territory

almost any addition to our population

was useful in developing our resources and was to be wel39Richmond Mayo-Smith, '’Control of Immigration," Political Science Quarterly, III, part I (March, 1888), p p . "4b-77;
part II (June, 1888), pp. 197-225; part III (September, 1888),
pp. 409-424,
40Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration, I," pp. 46-47.
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corned."^

But in the final years of the nineteenth century,

such conditions no longer applied.
The first work of the pioneer has been done
and will never have to be done again. We
have not brought all our land under cultiva
tion, but we have taken up the better part
of it, and there is no reason why we should
desire to cultivate that inferior part which
will make a less return for the labor.42
With the most arable public lands already under cultivation,
and with population density increasing in the United States,
there was no longer a need for immigrants.

43

When added to the

problems caused by the lack of assimilation on the part of
the "new" immigrants and the effect of immigration on the
social and political institutions of the nation, this factor
could lead only to the conclusion of a need for some type of
restriction.
Mayo-Smith again touched upon the frontier theme in his
major work on the topic, Emigration and Immigration, published
in 1890.

He reiterated his belief that not all of the Western

lands had been settled, but that most of the productive ones
had, and he again emphasized the idea that the benefits of
immigration could no longer be assumed in an era in which
the valuable public lands had disappeared.*^

Again, the loss

41-Mayo-Smith,, "Control of Immigration, II," p. 198.
4*Ibid., p. 219.
43Mayo-Smith produced a statistical chart to demonstrate
the increasing population density as the lands were settled
more and more: "Control of Immigration. I," p. 52n.
44Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, pp. 96-97, 119.
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of the frontier provided a convincing argument against
further immigration.
The frontier argument, however, meant much more to
Mayo-Smith than a simple statement of the closing of the
public lands.

As a rational economist and political scien

tist, Mayo-Smith was more concerned with the loss of the
frontier as a safety valve for immigrant laborers, and with
the loss of the pioneering process as a means of assimilat
ing and Americanizing the masses of foreigners in the
United States.

His major use of the frontier theme involved

those more advanced elements of the problem of immigration
and the closing of the Western lands.

In itself, however, the simple fact of the impending
loss of the public lands in the West was a direct motivating
force behind the drive for immigration restriction in the
late nineteenth century.

By the middle of the 1890's, eco

nomic depression and the collapse of the agricultural fron
tier strongly intensified the campaign.

Even Western con

gressmen were voting for restriction by that time, arid the
Western states had eliminated their earlier promotion of
immigration.46

46

When also applied to the themes of the safety

Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 73-74; Higham,
"Origins of Immigration Restriction," pp. 86-87. For indi
cation of declining Western encouragement of immigration in
the 1890's, see "Immigration, Past and Present," The Review
of Reviews. Ill (July, 1891), pp. 571-572; and Chetwood,
"Immigration, Hard Times, and the Veto," p. 795.

76

valve and the Americanization process, the belief in the
disappearance of the frontier was an even more powerful
incentive for restriction.

CHAPTER V
RESTRICTION AND THE LOSS OF THE SAFETY VALVE
The writers who demanded immigration restriction in the
1880's and 1890's emphasized the closing of the frontier in
a special argument aimed at the social and economic fears
of the American public.

The restrictionists claimed that

the exhaustion of the public lands signaled the end of the
protection traditionally offered to American economic insti
tutions by the frontier as a safety valve.

With the safety

valve gone, they suggested, immigrants no longer could take
up farms in the West; they instead would crowd into the in
dustrial cities of the East.

There, they would not only

increase the burdens of crime and pauperism, but, more im
portantly, they would compete with native-born workers for
jobs and drive down the wages and standard of living of the
American working class.

A large urban population of for

eigners, furthermore, would increase trade unionism and
labor unrest in the United States, the restrictionists
claimed, and would raise the threat of socialism and anar
chism.

The flood of immigrants, then, combined with the

loss of the safety valve, constituted a grave threat to
American society.

This argument was another effective one
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used by many of the opponents of immigration.

Americans traditionally had believed that the frontier
served as a safety valve, with the cheap lands of the West
providing economic opportunity to all and draining off in
dustrial workers from the East to Western farms.

In this

way, Americans claimed, the frontier safety valve reduced
labor competition in the East, maintained wages at a high
level, eased depressions by providing an outlet for unem
ployed workers, prevented class consciousness and labor
unrest, and generally destroyed social and economic ten
sions in the United States.

The frontier, therefore, served

as the stabilizing force for the American republic.1
Belief in the safety valve began practically with the
settlement of the continent.

Turner found a 1634 statement

by Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay Colony indicating
that the availability of lands in New England caused settlers
2
to neglect their trades.
The safety valve was a basic
tenet-: of

Jeffersonian agrarianism; Jefferson himself in

1805 wrote to a friend that the Western lands would prevent
the rise of a large discontented laboring class in the young
republic.

1The best general discussions of the safety valve theory
are to be found in Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American
West as Symbol and Myth (New York: Vintage Books, 195 7) , pp.
201-210; and Billington, America's Frontier Heritage, pp. 2938.
2Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. 62.
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As yet our manufacturers [industrial workers]
are as much at their ease, as independent and
moral as our agricultural inhabitants, and
they will continue so as long as there are
vacant lands for them to resort to; because
whenever it shall be attempted by the other
classes to reduce them to the minimum of sub
sistence, they will quit their trades and go
to laboring the earth.3
Throughout the nineteenth century Americans continued to pay
homage to the values of their safety valve.

Horace Greeley

often emphasized the theme in his New York Tribune, and en
couraged Eastern workers to move west in order to relieve
the suffering caused by the Panic of 1837.^

Europeans as

well praised the safety valve as the factor that prevented
unrest in America.

The famous English historian Thomas B.

Macauley indicated his views on the safety valve in a letter
to an American friend in 1857: "As long as you have a bound
less extent of fertile and unoccupied land, your laboring
population will be far more at ease than the laboring pop
ulation of the Old World, and, while that is the case the
Jefferson politics may continue to exist without causing
any fatal calamity."^

The safety valve doctrine was a major

impetus behind the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, and,

3

Jefferson, Writings, edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb
(20 vols.; Washington, 1903-1904), XI, p. 55. Quoted in
Smith, Virgin Land, p. 203.
4

Smith, ibid., pp. 201-202.

^G. 0. Trevelyan, The Life and Letters of Lord Macauley
(New York, 1909), II, pp. 451-454. Quoted by Nixon, "Pre
cursors of Turner in the Interpretation of the American Fron
tier," p. 84.
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Americans believed, provided part of the reason for the suc
cess of American democracy.

Turner, in a 1903 article for

the Atlantic Monthly, summarized the traditional concept of
the safety valve’s contribution to American stability and
freedom.

The free lands in the West, he said, made the

American ideal of opportunity real: "Whenever social condi
tions tended to crystallize in the East, whenever capital
tended to press upon labor or political restraints to impede
the freedom of the mass, there was this gate of escape to
the free conditions of the frontier."^
An important corollary of the safety valve theory was
that the free lands of the West provided a safety valve for
immigrants as well as for American workers, thus preventing
the foreign-born from flocking into the cities.

"Hearty

young laboring men" from abroad could easily purchase the
cheap lands of the United States, and become prosperous
farmers instead of city workers, Benjamin Franklin announced
as early as the 1780’s: "Multitudes of poor people from Eng
land, Ireland, Scotland, and Germany have by this means in a
few years, become wealthy farmers who, in their own countries,
where all the lands are fully occupied and the wages of labor
low, could never have emerged from the poor condition wherein
they were born."

Even Alexander Hamilton, the principal

6Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. 259.
7

Quoted by Joseph Schafer, "Was the West a Safety Valve
for Labor?," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIV
(December, 1937), p. 300”.
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spokesman for the future of industrialism in the young re
public, agreed in his 1790 Report on Manufactures that the
Western lands would attract immigrants away from the Eastern
factories.
The desire of being an independent proprietor
of land is founded on such strong principles
in the human breast, that where the opportunity
of becoming so is as great as it is in the
United States, the proportion will be small of
those whose situations would otherwise lead to
it, who would be diverted from it to manufac
tures. And it is highly probable . . . that
the accessions of foreigners who, originally
drawn over by manufacturing views, would after
wards abandon them for agricultural, would be
more than an equivalent for those of our citi- g
zens who might happen to be detached from them.
Alexis de Tocqueville supported this sentiment in Democracy in
America: "No

power on earth can close upon the immigrantthat

fertile wilderness which offers
a refuge from all want."

resources to all industry and

After the passage of the Homestead

Act, Americans believed that the West provided sufficient farm
land for both the native-born and the foreign-born, and set
tlers lauded that fact in a song they sang on the way west in
the 1870's.
Come
along, come along, make no delay,
Come
from every nation, come from every way;
Our lands are broad enough, don't be alarmed,
For Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm.
8Ibid., p. 301.
^Quoted by Charles Stewart Smith, "Our National DumpingGrounds: A Study of Immigration," The North American Review,
CLIV (April, 1892), p. 433.
“
^Quoted by Eric Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (rev.
ed. ; New York: Vintage Books, 1955) , p. 2Z~.
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Until Uncle Sam started to run out of farms in the 1880's
and 1890’s, most Americans believed that the frontier pro
vided an ample safety valve for all immigrants who came to
the nation's shores.

Twentieth-century historians, of course, have demon
strated that the safety valve theory was a myth.

As a sig

nificant means of attracting workers and immigrants from the
East, the frontier safety valve never operated.

Laborers

from the East simply did not go west in any appreciable

For the principal twentieth-century attacks on the
safety valve theory, see Murray Kane, "Some Considerations
on the Safety Valve Doctrine," Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XXIII (September, 1936), pp. 169-188; Fred A. Shannon,
"The Homestead Act and the Labor Surplus," American Historical
Review, XLI (July, 1936), pp. 637-651; Shannon, "A Post-Mortem
on the Labor-Safety-Valve Theory," Agricultural History, XIX
(January, 1945), pp. 31-37; Clarence H. Danhof, "Farm-Making
Costs and the 'Safety Valve': 1850-60," Journal of Political
Economy, XLIX (June, 1941), pp. 317-359; Henry M. Littlefield,
"Has the Safety Valve Come Back to Life?," Agricultural His
tory. XXXVIII (January, 1964), pp. 47-49; Carter Goodrich and
Sol Davison, "The Wage-Earner in the Westward Movement," Polit
ical Science Quarterly, L (June, 1935), pp. 161-185, and LI
(March, 1936), pp. 61-116; and Smith, Virgin Land, pp. 201210. For articles defending certain aspects of the safety
valve, see George G. S. Murphy and Arnold Zellner, "Sequential
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1958), pp. 250-257; Ellen von Nardroff, "The American Frontier
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numbers in the nineteenth century.

For one thing, they did

not have the capital necessary to purchase lands, buy live
stock and farm equipment, and transport their families to
the frontier.

12

More importantly, Eastern workers lacked the

skill and knowledge of agriculture necessary for one to be
come a prosperous farmer.

Furthermore, historical evidence

indicates that workers remained in Eastern cities in times of
depression, and migrated to other areas only when times were
prosperous, contrary to the basic suppositions of the safety
valve.

Nor did the safety valve prevent labor unrest as it

was expected to do, because there were, in the 1870's and
1880's, many examples of violent labor conflict in the United
States.

There may have been a few workers who did settle upon

Western farms, but their number was not significant enough to
justify the presence of an actual frontier safety valve.
1

Immigrants, moreover, did not settle on Western farms in
any appreciable numbers in the nineteenth century.

Many thou

sands of Germans and Scandinavians, it is true, did settle on
Midwestern homesteads, but the vast majority of the immigrants-especially the "new" immigrants--went into cities even when
frontier land was available.

Like American workers, they

lacked the money, skill, and knowledge necessary to become
Western farmers.

They had come to America with a vague hope

for economic improvement, but with no specific hopes for an

12

See, especially, Danhof, "Farm-Making Costs and the
'Safety Valve'," pp. 317-359.
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isolated rural farm.

13

As a general rule, the frontier did

not act as a safety valve for the immigrants in the nineteenth
century.
This historical evidence, however, does not contradict
the pervasive belief in the West as a safety valve in the
nineteenth century.

The fact is that almost all Americans

of that era sincerely believed that the frontier always had
served as a safety valve, and they had no historians proving
to them that they were wrong.^

The notion was accepted and

unquestioned at the time.
This pervasive belief in the safety valve meant that
Americans would fear seriously the loss of that means of pro
tection when the public lands disappeared.

As early as 1838

a United States Congressman had questioned the future effect
on the nation when the safety valve evaporated.
Whenever labor has found itself straitened by
population exceeding the ready means of subsis
tence, it has found a safe and abundant refuge
in the mighty wilds of the West. So long as
this resource exists, the free systems of Gov
ernment in the Northern States may endure . . . .

13

Dovring, "European Reactions to the Homestead Act,"
pp. 462-464; Jones, American Immigration, pp. 210-216.
14
Some recent historians have indicated that the prevalent
strength of the safety valve myth may have created what they
call a "socio-psychological safety valve." That is, even though
Eastern workers hardly ever moved to a farm in the West, they
always believed that they could if their conditions became
desperate enough.
In this way, the socio-psychological safety
valve lowered labor discontent and unrest. See Billington,
America^ Frontier Heritage, pp. 32-38; and Nardroff, "The
American Frontier as a Safety Valve," pp. 123-142.
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But the time will come,--is rapidly approach
ing, when the way to the West will be blocked
up. Population will increase there, too, and
diminish the price of labor . . . . What, then,
will become of the Republican forms of Govern
ment in the Northern States [?]^^
When, in the 1880’s and 1890’s, the loss of the public domain
and its safety valve appeared imminent, Americans became
anxious about the future of their prosperity and their polit
ical stability.

One way by which the effects of this danger

could be minimized, the restrictionists claimed, would be to
reduce immigration.

The restrictionists who used the safety valve theme
emphasized that the crowding of the immigrants into cities,
because of the loss of the frontier, would create labor com
petition, reduce the level of wages, and promote the rise of
socialism and labor conflict.

Such predictions were designed

to--and did--arouse the direct, personal fears of the American
people.

Josiah Strong was again one of the first to employ

this argument, with a brief reference to the passing of the
safety valve in Our Country in 1885,

Strong mentioned a com

mon fear of the era, that with crowded urban conditions and
labor unrest, the United States would lose its unique pros
perity and fall victim to the problems besetting the Old World.

■^U.S., Congress, House, Representative R. B. Rhett of
South Carolina speaking for the independent treasury bill,
25th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 25, 1838, Congressional Globe,
appendix, p. 506.
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The rapid accumulation of our wealth, our com
parative immunity from the consequences of un
scientific legislation, our financial elasticity,
our high wages, the general welfare and content
ment of the people hitherto have all been due,
in very large measure, to an abundance of cheap
land. When the supply is exhausted, we shall
enter upon a new era, and shall more rapidly
approximate European conditions of life.
Now, Strong announced, those public lands were nearly gone,
and the loss of that traditional safety valve would threaten
the American political system: ''After our agricultural land
is all occupied, as it will be a few years hence, our agri
cultural population, which is one of the great sheet-anchors
of society against the socialistic current, will increase but
little, while great manufacturing and mining towns will go on
multiplying and to multiply." 17

As the major source of the

"socialistic current," immigrants would be an even more impor
tant danger to the country once the safety valve was gone.
This fact, according to Strong, provided a further reason for
the necessity of protecting America against an invasion of
immigrants.
Although it was not one of his major concerns, Francis
Amasa Walker also touched upon the safety valve theme in his
argument for restriction.

As an economist, Walker heartily

agreed that the safety valve had been of vital significance
to America's high level of wages, as he pointed out in one
of his scholarly works.

^Strong, Our Country, p. 153.
17Ibid., p. 108.
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It has been the competition of the farm with
the shop which has, from the first, most effect
ually retarded the growth of manufactures in
the United States . . . .
Now, the mode of living on the part of the
agricultural population has necessarily set a
minimum standard of wages for mechanical labor.
With an abundance of cheap land, with a popu
lation facile to the last degree in making
change of avocation and of residence, few ablebodied men are likely to be drawn into factories
and shops on terms which imply a meaner sub
sistence than that secured in the cultivation
of the soil.1**
But the loss of such a system of protection meant, to Walker,
the rise

of labor competition and unrest, a fact only

com

pounded by the presence of masses of immigrants driven into
the cities.

In the same article in which he called for a

one-hundred-dollar deposit from all foreign arrivals in the
United States in order to decrease immigration, Walker ex
plained how immigration and the loss of the safety valve
combined to endanger the nation.
With, on one side, the resort to the land now
become more difficult and costly, and, on the
other, with declining wages in the harvest
field, it would be surprising, indeed, if the
more intelligent of the labor-leaders did not
look with apprehension upon the spectacle of
five millions of foreigners and more added to
our population within ten years. Reluctant as
we may be to recognize it, a labor-problem is
at last upon us. No longer can a continent
of free virgin lands avert from us the social
struggle which the old world has known so long
and so painfully.

18

Walker, Political Economy (2nd ed., rev.; New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1887), pp. 512-513.
1Q
Walker, "Immigration,11 p. 130.
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The loss of the safety valve only increased the threat of
urban immigrants leading the United States into a state of
labor and class conflict.

Such a danger, according to

Walker, was another indication of the absolute need for
restriction.
Richmond Mayo-Smith’s economics also included an accept
ance of the safety valve doctrine, and he, too, applied the
theory to the problem of immigration.

As with his use of the

simple fact of the exhaustion of the public lands, Mayo-Smith
did not over-emphasize the safety valve theme, nor was it his
principal concern in his campaign against immigration.

It

was, nevertheless, a factor of sufficient importance to be
indicated, and in his major work Emigration and Immigration
Mayo-Smith directed special attention toward the traditional
importance of the safety valve in the West.
Few people realize how this abundance of land
has simplified all social problems for us in
this country. We have laughed at the fear of
over-population,--that nightmare of the coun
tries of Europe. There has always been room
for the restless and energetic. When a man
failed in the East he could go to the West.
When trade became unprofitable, a man could
take to agriculture. Our public land has
been our great safety-valve, relieving the
pressure of economic distress and failure.
This enormous expansion has been due very
largely to it.20
Such an abundance of lands, Mayo-Smith indicated, always had
provided an outlet for immigrants, but, with the lands declin
ing, the immigrants now were settling in the cities and
threatening the social institutions of America.
20Mayo-Smith,

He stressed

Emigration and I m m i g r a t i o n , pp.

56-57.
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such a fear in his 1888 series, of articles for the Political
Science Quarterly.

He contradicted the views of those who

claimed that further immigration was needed to settle the
public lands, pointing out that the better, more arable por
tions of the public domain had already been appropriated and
that the ‘'great safety valve*' was therefore disappearing.
With the lands vanishing at so rapid a rate, the nation should
preserve those that remained for its own citizens:

"This

great domain should perform the same service for future gen
erations that it has already performed for the present.

Be

cause we have a valuable heritage, why should we divide it
among strangers?"

With the end of the safety valve approach

ing, Mayo-Smith declared, the United States should make cer
tain that the dangers posed by immigration were eliminated as
soon as possible.

21

More rational and perceptive than most of the other re
strictionists of his era, Mayo-Smith did not exaggerate the
importance of the safety valve.

At times, he even agreed

that much of the Western land still remained open to settle
ment.

But, he pointed out in statements foreshadowing those

of twentieth-century historians, the immigrants did not go to
those lands.
One of the greatest misconceptions about this
whole subject is, I believe, that all we have
to do with this mass of immigrants is put them
on the land "out West" and make farmers of

^Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration. Ill," pp. 417-418.
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them . . . . Now the great mass of these
laborers are not farmers at all or even farm
laborers . . . . They do not possess either
the skill, or the capital, or the knowledge
of modern methods and the use of agricultural
machinery, requisite to enter into the ranks
of the farmers of this c o u n t r y . 22
To Mayo-Smith, the safety valve was something to be saved for
Americans, but it was only one small segment of his argument
for immigration restriction.

He was much more concerned with

the fact that the immigrants of the 1880’s, especially when
driven into the cities, did not assimilate into the American
culture.

The disappearance of the safety valve, along with the
general disappearance of the frontier, became a factor of
even greater concern to Americans with the rise of the agri
cultural and economic depressions of the 1890’s, and it was
one of the many factors that intensified the drive for immi23
gration restriction in that period.
The rising flow of
the immigrants into cities, it was claimed, threatened the
traditional concepts of the republic, as well as its eco
nomic stability.

What really bothered the restrictionists,

however, was the character of the new immigrants of the late
nineteenth century, and the fact that, living in cities, they

’’Control of Immigration. II," p. 217.
also Emigration and Immigration, pp. 115-116.
^Mayo-Smith,

See

23p0r allusions to this theme in the 1890’s, see Canby,
"Immigration,” p. 198; and Chetwood, Jr., "Immigration, Hard
Times, and the Veto," pp. 795-796.
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did not assimilate into true Americans.

The closing of the

frontier provided the spokesmen for restriction with ammuni
tion to use with this argument, too.

CHAPTER VI
RESTRICTION AND THE LOSS OF
PIONEER AMERICANIZATION
The process of assimilation was the factor at the heart
of the restrictionists1 fears of the new immigrants.

As long

as immigrants to the United States had adapted to the civili
zation of the New World, as long as they had discarded their
European habits and customs and become true ‘'Americans," the
native-born inhabitants of the nation generally had accepted
them.

But in the 1880's and 1890's Americans discovered that

the current group of immigrants, particularly those from
southern and eastern Europe, did not "Americanize."

They

instead retained their European languages, dress, religions,
and manners; they lived by themselves in isolated sections
of the nation's cities, and even read their own foreignlanguage newspapers.

This created, in effect, a group of

foreign nations existing within the United States, the re
strictionists said, and threatened the stability of the coun
try:

"The danger which threatens us is the growth of a

large foreign element in our population

whose habits of

thought and behavior are radically different from those
which the founders of the nation hoped to establish
92

here.
The problem of assimilation was a crucial one that was
a part of a general American concern throughout the second
half of the nineteenth century1’-the desire to create a ra
cially homogeneous society.

The goal of homogeneity was

particularly a part of Republican ideology, and it was the
Republican party that most often led the political campaign
against immigration.

From its beginnings in the 1850’s,

the Republican party had sought a type of racial homogeneity
in the United States, asserting, for example, that it was
’’the white man's party" and trying to prevent the expansion
of blacks into the territories.

By the latter part of the

century, the party’s ideology still included a goal of racial
purity, directed not only against the future of blacks in
American society but against non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants as
?
well.
This ideology was a predominant one within the general
American public in the 1880's and 1890's, and the rise of
Darwinian thought in that era gave new respectability to the
idea of racial conflict, the struggle for existence among
racial groups, and the eventual establishment of a homogeneous
1-Noble, "The Present State of the Immigration Question,"
p. 232.
^George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind
The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 18l7-1914
(New York: Harper § Row, 19yi), pp. 130-147, 324. Fredrickson
argument is concerned mainly with American antagonism against
blacks in the nineteenth century, but his theories on the
desire for racial homogeneity apply also to the prejudice
against the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe
in the 1880’s and 1890's.
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society.

3

The late nineteenth century, therefore, witnessed

an extensive desire for a completely white, Anglo-Saxon civ
ilization in the United States, a goal that seemed thwarted
by the increasing numbers of immigrants in the country.
Immigrants, Americans believed, posed a more immediate threat
because they no longer assimilated into that dominant American
society.

The restrictionists claimed that the loss of the

frontier provided one reason why the immigrants no longer
assimilated.
Americans traditionally had believed that the pioneering
process had made a man, particularly a newcomer to the United
States, more "American."

By travelling to the Western parts

of the continent, and thus removing himself as far as possible
from the tainted conditions of the Old World; by struggling
against the wilderness; by building his own house, creating
a farm, and providing for his family; in short, by living the
rugged life of a pioneer, a man attached himself to his new
land and to the American nation.

The independent farmer on

the frontier, Americans declared, developed courage, inven
tiveness, initiative, self-reliance, and all the other traits
that supposedly made one a real American citizen.

Pioneering,

moreover, taught men the virtues of equality and democracy,
and thus contributed to their worth as citizens of the repub
lic.

The frontier, therefore, as Lord Bryce declared, was

"the most American part of America," an area in which constant

5Ibid., pp. 228-232.
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hard work made a man less of a European, and more of an American. 4
The belief that the availability of farmlands in the
West would help to Americanize immigrants had been one of
the forces behind the passage of the Homestead Act, as the
debates that centered around that measure in the 1850's and
1860*s indicated.

Representative Cyrus L. Dunham of Indiana,

arguing for an early homestead bill proposal in 1852, declared
that free lands would prevent immigrants from crowding into
cities and would, therefore, attach the immigrants more closely
to the United States government:

"There is something in the

nature of man which makes him cling to that spot of earth he
can call his own, and to the government that protects him in
its enjoyment."5

Representative Willard P. Hall of Missouri

agreed.
If, by a system of legislation at once just and
beneficial to our citizens generally, we can
induce the foreign immigrant to make his home
in the West, we secure his attachment and fidel
ity to our institutions. As soon as he finds
himself in possession of a home, and occupying
a position that makes him a free man--free from
the control, direction, and oppression of a
superior, he will and must feel proud of Ameri
can citizenship. He becomes identified with us
in hopes, in interest, and feeling.^
Such a belief continued throughout the rest of the nineteenth

4
Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p. 697.
5Quoted in Abbott, Historical Aspects of the Immigration
Problem, pp. 778-779.
6Ibid., p. 780.
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century.

Theodore Roosevelt, in his 1889 historical work on

The Winning of the West,

continually emphasized the American

izing qualities of frontier life.

Speaking of the early

Alleghany frontier, for example, Roosevelt described how
people from all nations fused into a unit under pioneer
conditions: "A single generation, passed under the hard
conditions of life in the wilderness, was enough to weld
together into one people the representatives of these num
erous and widely different races; and the children of the
next generation became indistinguishable from one another."
The result, Roosevelt announced, was that foreigners became
Americans "in speech, thought, and culture," and they "lost
all remembrance of Europe and all sympathy with things
European."

7

The Americanizing qualities of the frontier received
their most famous praises in the writings of Frederick Jack
son Turner in the 1890's and early 1900's.

Turner, in his

1893 essay on "The Significance of the Frontier in American
History," stated the theme most directly:

"The frontier is

the line of most rapid and effective Americanization."

Be

cause, according to Turner, life on the frontier brought a
continual "return to primitive conditions," immigrants who
moved West discarded their old customs and behavior traits
and accepted new elements of civilization:

"The advance of

the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influ^Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt,
National Edition (20 vols. ; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1926),

VIII,

p.

89.
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ence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American
O
lines.”
Consequently, “a composite nationality for the
American people” developed on the frontier from the diverse
groups of people who moved there: ”In the crucible of the
frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and
fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor
Q
characteristics.”
Turner reiterated the theme at greater length over the
next decade in his articles for the Atlantic Monthly.

Not

only did the frontier Americanize the immigrant socially,
he proposed, but it further promoted in the immigrant the
ideals of American democracy.

Pioneer life encouraged a

belief in equality, individual liberty, and confidence in
America, and gave the immigrant a faith "in the manifest
destiny of his country.'1^®

The process occurred over and

over again across the continent, molding each wave of set
tlers into staunch American citizens.
European men, institutions, and ideas were
lodged in the American wilderness, and this
great American West took them to her bosom,
taught them a new way of looking upon the
destiny of the common man, trained them in
adaptation to the conditions of the New World,
to the creation of new institutions to meet
new needs; and ever as society on her eastern
border grew to resemble the Old World in its
social forms and its industry, ever, as it
began to lose faith in the ideals of democracy,

8

Turner, The Frontier in American History, pp. 2-4.

9Ibid., pp. 22-23.
10Ibid., pp. 210-215.
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she opened new provinces, and dowered new
democracies in her most distant dominions
with her material treasures and with the
ennobling influence that the fierce love of
freedom, the strength that came from hewing
out a home, making a school and a church,
and creating a higher future for his family,
furnished to the pioneer.1
The frightening aspect of Turner's Americanization theory
was that it implied that, when the "most distant dominions"
of the continent had been settled, the Americanization pro
cess must cease.

To the immigration restrictionists, such a

thought menaced the future of American democracy and civili
zation.

Roosevelt and Turner taught the virtues of the pioneer
life to the American public at the very time when Americans
were beginning to hear of the impending disappearance of the
frontier.

The spokesmen for immigration restriction combined

these ideas and discovered a vital new stimulus for halting
the flow of immigrants to the United States.

The fact that

modern historians have shown that most immigrants did not go
to the West even when lands were available does not contradict
the power of such a belief.

Americans of the late nineteenth*

century sincerely believed that the frontier had attracted
immigrants,

12

and thus, to them, the loss of the frontier re-

X1Ibid., p. 267.
12

Turner declared that immigrants "obviously" had been
attracted by cheap lands: ibid., p. 21.
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moved the most important factor that had contributed to the
assimilation of immigrants.

Without the frontier, Americans

believed that immigrants would be forced into cities, where
they would threaten the stability of the nation.
Various writers of the 1880's and 1890's emphasized this
theme, some in an attempt to hasten the passage of restriction
laws, others as a means to promote governmental measures that
would help develop the unsettled portions of the West.
Brigadier-General Nelson A. Miles, in an 1890 article for
The North American Review, agreed that pioneer life produced
an American character, and that the dwindling of good lands
in the West meant that those who now sought asylun in the
United States could only turn to a degraded life in the cit
ies.

On the basis of this information, Miles called for

federally sponsored immigration projects to open the arid
lands of the West to settlement and provide new areas for the
future of the pioneer life.

13

To others, however, the loss of

the frontier as an Americanizing

process

implied that the

United States should begin to stop immigration.

Josiah Strong

declared that the decline of the public domain, and the conse
quent appearance in the cities of "little Germanies here,
little Scandinavias there, and little Irelands yonder," up
set the whole system of Americanization: "Our safety demands
the assimilation of these strange populations, and the process

13

Nelson A. Miles, "Our Unwatered Empire," The North
American Review, CL (March, 1890), pp. 370-371.
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of assimilation will become slower and more difficult as the
proportion of foreigners increases.

Francis Amasa Walker

also agreed that the pioneering process traditionally had
promoted America’s democratic growth:

’’None can doubt that

both the increase of our population and its expansion over a
continually wider territory, have been the chief causes of
the remarkable development among us of that public spirit
1S
which we call patriotism.1'
But with the lands of the West
disappearing, immigrants were pouring into the cities, divid
ing into separate colonies, speaking their own languages,
refusing to adapt to **a land of free laws and educated labor."

16

The inability of the immigrants to assimilate into American
society was, to Walker, Strong, and other leaders of the peri
od, the most frightening aspect of late nineteenth-century
immigration.

Richmond Mayo-Smith, as usual, provided the most cogent
exposition of the theme.

Assimilation, in fact, was Mayo-

Smith' s most basic concern in the entire immigration question,

14

Strong, Our Country, p. 45. In the 1891 revised edi
tion of the book, Strong noted that another means of American
izing the immigrants, the public school system, was likewise
threatened by recent immigration, particularly by Catholics
who demanded their separate schools: Strong, Our Country
(rev. ed.; New York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1891), pp. 79106.
15Address at Brown University, 1889. Quoted in Ray Allen
Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, p. 121.
1 fi

Walker, "Immigration," p. 134.
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and his belief that the immigrants of the 1880's and 1890's
did

not assimilate as readily as. had earlier arrivals ledhim

to call

for restriction.

He was

too discerning an observer

ever to state that the closing of the frontier was the only
factor that impeded assimilation, but he certainly saw it as
one of the factors, and he often used the idea in his writ
ings.
The frontier life, Mayo-Smith declared, had, in the
early years of the nation, allowed the United States to assim
ilate foreigners easily; but as that type of life disappeared,
the country should consider a re-evaluation of its immigration
policy.
We are no longer in that vigorous early civ
ilization when we could digest almost anything
sent to us and when the conditions of life here
corrected and controlled the weaknesses of the
immigrants.
In a frontier life, the new-comer
not only has a chance to begin over but, in a
sense, he is obliged to do so. He is thrown on
himself and obliged to look out for himself . .
. . At the present time the conditions are en
tirely different. The immigrant . . . finds in
this country, especially in our large cities,
exactly the same environment that he has come
from. He may if he chooses take up the same
life here which he has left on the other side
of the water.
If he is weak in resolution, the
temptation will be strong to stick to the old
familiar ways instead of sticking out in a new
and difficult path.l?
With free lands disappearing, Mayo-Smith declared, and with
Americanization made that much more difficult, the United States
could no longer admit just anybody.

The nation had to enact

legislation to remove the undesirable, more unassimilable
l^Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration, I," pp. 68-69.

!
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elements from the flow of immigrants.

In two articles on

assimilation for the Political Science Quarterly in 1894,
he emphasized this idea.

18

Race mixture in general, Mayo-Smith

suggested, was a corruptive force within a nation, so that
the promotion of assimilation by intermarriage of different
racial stocks in the United States was a retrogressive idea.
Assimilation, the fusing of various peoples, institutions,
and customs into a composite American nationality, could be
promoted effectively only through the influence of the social
environment and the physical environment.

Mayo-Smith was

optimistic about the capacity of the American social environ
ment- -particularly the public education system--to Americanize
foreign-born citizens.

But, he noted ominously, the disappear

ance of the frontier threatened the survival of the other fac
tor promoting assimilation, the physical environment and the
frontier life.
The frontier life, Mayo-Smith asserted, had been the
"most powerful influence" in the development of the nation.
Constant struggle against nature had promoted self-reliance
and self-government, and by such a process the immigrant had
become "a pioneer of civilization."

He had abandoned his old

traditions, and had adopted new American customs and pioneer
traits.

19

But now Americans no longer could rely on that

l^Mayo-Smith, "Assimilation of Nationalities in the United
States," Political Science Quarterly, IX (September, December,
1894),

pp7

"

426

-

444,

G'WFTJBY

19Ibid., p. 440.
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experience as an assimilating element.
It may be remarked, in passing, that this
'assimilating force, which has so powerfully
influenced our past history, tends to become
less prominent with the settling up of the
country. The frontier life is largely a
thing of the past. The best land has been
taken up. The conditions of living over a
great portion of the country are similar to
those of Europe. A larger and larger propor
tion of the population live in towns and cities
where these primitive influences are not
felt . . . . Now the immigrants find here men
of their own tongue, newspapers in their own
language . . . . They sink into positions al
ready opened for them, and they find an environ
ment suited to their previous habits.20
The result was that the immigrants remained European, instead
of becoming Americans, and they thus threatened American so
ciety.
Mayo-Smith*s major work, Emigration and Immigration, is
at bottom an extended study of the process of assimilation in
the United States.

Mayo-Smith believed that a stable society

had to be as homogeneous as possible, and that immigrants who
did not assimilate retarded the growth of American civiliza
tion.
A nation is great, not on account of the number
of individuals contained within its boundaries,
but through the strength begotten of common
national ideals and aspirations. No nation can
exist and be powerful that is not homogeneous
in this sense. And the great ethnic problem we
have before us is to fuse those diverse elements
into one common nationality, having one language,
one political practice, one patriotism and one
ideal of social development.21

2QIbid., p. 441.
21

Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, p. 78.
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Mayo-Smith was concerned with the effects that immigration
brought to American society, how immigrants destroyed homo
geneity, and how it affected “the ethical consciousness of
22
the community."
American civilization, Mayo-Smith proposed, consisted
of four basic elements:

the tradition of freedom and self-

government; the social morality derived from Puritan New
England; a high standard of living for the working classes;
and beneficial social habits, such as a respect for law and
order, national patriotism, and confidence in the nation's
future.

Immigration, he asserted, threatened air of these

elements of civilization.

23

The presence of thousands of new

voters with no training in self-government menaced the nation's
political institutions.

Immigrant voters could be influenced

too much by city demagogues, or by the dictates of the
Catholic church, and the “importations of foreign agitators"
would bring anarchism and socialism to the United States.^
Immigration lowered the economic level of the American working
class by increasing labor competition and thus reducing wages.

25

J

i

22Ibid.t pp. 4-5.
23lbid.t pp. 5-8.
24Ibid., pp. 79-92.
25

Ibid., pp. 131-138. As a professional statistician,
Mayo-Smith even produced a method of calculating the economic
value of an immigrant, subtracting the cost of keeping him in
the community from the amount of wealth he added to the commun
ity, and capitalizing the result “at the current rate of
interest" to derive the current value of the man: p. 109.
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Immigration threatened American morality and “the social
health of the community11 by raising the levels of crime, vice,
illiteracy, and pauperism.

7 fi

The ''new" immigrants, in partic

ular, ’’ignorant, criminal and vicious,” lacking "the faintest
appreciation of what civilization means,” presented an awesome
danger to the nation.

27

The basis of the problem was assimilation.

The new

immigrants, Mayo-Smith believed, were so dangerous because
they did not assimilate as had earlier immigrants, and one
reason why they did not was the loss of the frontier.

With

most of the nation's lands settled, immigrants no longer filled
the needs of a pioneer society; they went, instead, into cit
ies and maintained their traditional European customs and
ties.

28

This, according to Mayo-Smith, was not the only fac\

tor threatening the process of assimilation--the number and
character of the new immigrants were really more important-but it was one of the significant factors.
Mayo-Smith was, obviously, antagonistic toward the char
acter of the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.

But

his racial views did not dominate his thoughts on immigration,
as was often the case with other spokesmen for restriction.
Mayo-Smith held the general prejudices of his society--against

26Ibid., pp. 147-167.
27Ibid., p. 133.
28Ibid., pp. 96-97, 119 ,
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blacks, against orientals, against non-Anglo-Saxons

29

--but

he was really more concerned with the economic and social
problems caused by immigration.

His argument, as a rule, was

reasoned and calm, and he tried to keep his demands for re
striction as free as possible from blatant bigotry.
The control of immigration must be free from
the base cry of ’’America for
the Americans,"
and from any narrow spirit of trade-unionism,
or of a selfish desire to monopolize the labor
market.
It must find its justification in the
needs of the community, and in the necessity
of selecting those elements which will contrib
ute to the harmonious development of our civil
ization. 30
He did not ask for total prohibition of immigration, or for
legislation directed specifically against any nationality
(except the Chinese).

He hoped to admit only those immi

grants who could assimilate into American society, and he
called for appropriate federal legislation that would eliminate unassimilable elements.

31

The problem to Mayo-Smith

was basically one of Americanization in a society that could
no longer rely on the assistance of the frontier.

The question of Americanization was really at the heart
of all the pleas for immigration restriction in the late nine
teenth century, and, in that respect, the loss of the frontier

29See, e.g., ibid., pp. 64-65, 247-248.
30Ibid., p. 278.
51Ibid., pp. 279-283.
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as an Americanizing force constituted the most important ele
ment for restrictionists who used the frontier theme.

Racial

fears and the fears of the exhaustion of the public lands com
bined most effectively in that type of argument.
Racial prejudice in itself probably could have generated
a drive for immigration restriction.

But in the 1880's and

the 1890's, the pervasive sense of the impending loss of the
public domain, the related fear of the disappearance of a
frontier safety valve, and the belief that without a frontier
the Americanization of immigrants was no longer assured, all
combined to accelerate the demands for restriction.
\

CHAPTER VII
THE OPPOSITION
The Americans of the 1880's and 1890's who opposed the
idea of immigration restriction--and a sizable number did-devised one simple method of countering the restrictionists'
emphasis on the closing of the public lands.

They simply

pointed to the West and said, "Look at all that empty land."
The unfortunate disadvantage of such a rejoinder was that,
more often than not, these spokesmen were pointing at worth
less lands.
On the surface, of course, the idea of declaring the
American continent in danger of overcrowding seemed an absurd
one.

"A man looking out on the vast, fertile, and as yet

sparsely-peopled sections of the South-west," wrote New Jersey
Congressman William McAdoo, "is not apt to dread unrestricted
immigration as much as he who daily views the scenes of our
great cities and those of mining and railroad centers."1
Carl Schurz, perhaps the nation's most distinguished immi
grant, agreed:

"In such a country, which is capable of

nourishing five times its present population, it is simply

■^William McAdoo, "Immigration and the Tariff," The
Forum, XI (June, 1891), p. 398.
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ridiculous to speak of overcrowding."
Many other Americans, both politicians and private citi
zens, denounced the idea of halting immigration on the basis
of declining public lands.

Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama,

speaking against the proposed contract labor bill in 1885,
ridiculed the theory.
The vast fields which are open now to settle
ment in our public domain, and where we ex
tend an invitation for settlement to every man
who will come here and declare his intention
of becoming a citizen of the United States,
are sufficient for the next twenty-five or
perhaps fifty years to absorb the unemployed
labor of all the civilized countries of
Europe that has any possible chance of emi
grating to this part of the world.3
The United States Commissioner of Immigration echoed the state
ment in 1892:

"Our resources have hardly been touched, cer

tainly the point of exhaustion has not been approached, so
that development is feasible and desirable."^

A few years

later his successor noted that the 1894 report of the Immigra
tion Investigating Commission suggested that most Western areas
were still trying to attract workers and settlers.'*

Some

2

Carl Schurz, "Restricting Immigration," Harper’s Weekly,
XLII (January 8, 1898), p. 27.
3

U. S., Congress, Senate, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb
ruary 13, 1885, Congressional Record, XVI, p. 1632. See also
the remarks of Senator Coke of Texas, ibid., pp. 1788-1790:.
4
John B. Weber, "Our National Dumping-Ground: A Study of
Immigration," The North American Review, CLIV (April, 1892),
p. 425.
^Joseph H. Senner, "The Immigration Question," Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, X
------- ----- -------- -CJuly'TlW)", p. 17.-----
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writers, such as Senator Henry C. Hansbrough of North Dakota,
even used vast expansionistic dreams to prove that there
would be plenty of room for immigrants.
There is ample room in the United States for
500,000,000 of people. By the time our popu
lation shall have reached one-fourth that number
the northern boundaries of the Union will have
been extended to the south coast of Greenland.
Shall we for a single moment turn back the tide
of willing workers who are to level and tunnel
the mountains and subdue the f o r e s t s ? ^
Even Henry George, so concerned about the appropriation of the
lands, was quoted as saying that the nation could support many
more immigrants.
I do not believe any restriction whatever upon
the immigration of people from Europe and of
the Caucasian race, who are not diseased and
who are not chronic paupers or criminals, is
needed, or is in accordance with the spirit of
our institutions. We should have room enough
for the whole population of Europe, were not
our lands monopolized, and were they taken from
the grasp of those who hold them for no other
purpose than the hope of profiting by their
increasing value.'7
There was, in fact, even in the depression years of the 1890's,
considerable optimism concerning the nation's potential growth.
A few authors devoted entire articles to refuting the fron
tier theme of the restrictionists, an indication of how power
ful the theme had become.

In an 1892 article entitled "Incalc

ulable Room for Immigrants,*' Edward Atkinson, a New England
businessman, tried to show that, even if the frontier had dis
appeared, plenty of land remained.
&Henry C. Hansbrough, "Why Immigration Should Not Be Sus
pended," The North American Review, CXLVI (February, 1893),
p. 224.
7Quoted in Wm. E. Chandler, "Methods of Restricting Immi
gration," The Forum, XIII (March, 1892), p. 137.
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The argument upon which the proposition for . . .
exclusion is based seems to be mainly that our
free land has been disposed of by the Government,
and that we have no longer any land to give away.
That may be admitted. What has it to do with
the question? The disposal of land by original
owners, either the government, the state, or
private persons, has no necessary connection g
with the occupancy and productive use of land.
Atkinson, noting the thousands of acres of unoccupied lands in
the Southwest and even in parts of the East, believed that immi
grants easily could purchase farmlands from their current
owners:

MAny one who chooses can become possessed of land

by purchase from private owners at this time at less cost to
himself than when nearly the whole of the Western prairies
were open to free occupancy under the homestead law . . . .
Land itself is more easily obtained than ever before.”
According to Atkinson, the frontier had somehow both dis
appeared and survived.
C. J. Buell, writing in The Arena in 1894, also answered
the frontier argument in a rather illogical manner.

Buell

first indicated that a government had no moral right to legis
late against immigration in the first place, becasue the
freedom to move about the globe was one of man's natural
rights.
Have you, my reader, a right to change your
habitation from St. Paul to California? Most
certainly. Then that same right you must
accord to every other one of your fellow-men.

8

Edward Atkinson, "Incalculable Room for Immigrants,"
The Forum, XIII (May, 1892), pp. 361-362.
9Ibid., pp. 362-364.

Quote from p. 364.
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Have you a right to expatriate yourself and
become a citizen of England, China or
Afghanistan? With equal emphasis you reply,
"Of course I have.1' Then you must accord
that right to every other person on earth.10
But Buell was more concerned with showing that immigration was
still a material benefit to the United States, and that there
should be ample lands upon which immigrants could settle.

Ob

viously a disciple of Henry George, Buell declared that land
monopoly provided the only problem of the period, and that the
existence of land monopoly deluded Americans into believing
that their continent was overcrowded.

If land monopoly were

eliminated by the single tax, Buell proposed, immigrants would
be able to settle in the West in large numbers.

11

Look at this fair America of ours to-day, and
see how few and how scattering are its people.
More than all the inhabitants of the United
States could live in peace and comfort east of
the Alleghany Mountains were it not for the
curse of land monopoly. Less than half the
land even in New York City is really occupied
and used. More than half is only partially used
or is held idle by speculators who expect to
reap large profits from the increase of values .~
which always comes with increase of population.
By opening up the remaining lands as they should be, Buell
suggested, the country would have abundant space for an in
crease of population.
Another writer, Simon G. Croswell, in 1897 vehemently
contradicted the idea that the United States had reached the

1 (I)

C. J. Buell, "Immigration and the Land Question,"
The Arena, X (November, 1894), p. 807.
11Ibid., pp. 809-813.
l^Ibid.t p t 813.
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saturation point in population: "Can the most ardent advocate
of the Malthusian doctrine claim that the United States al
ready has too many inhabitants, or is in danger of having too
many in the immediate future?

Do we not rather need to en

courage immigration, to fling wide open the gates of our
country and secure as large an addition to our working force
as possible?”

13

Croswell believed that the undeveloped lands

of the West, "where the average percentage of population to
the area of the land dwindles in some localities almost to
the vanishing point," still cried out for settlers.14

A

large number of Americans of the late nineteenth century would
have agreed with such a view.

Those who claimed that the nation still had plenty of
room for immigrants were correct in a literal sense.
was an abundance of empty land in the West,

There

By the 1890*5,

however, many Americans had begun to realize that the lands
that did remain available were not suitable for cultivation
by a yeoman homesteader.

Throughout the last two decades of

the nineteenth century, several spokesmen, and John Wesley
Powell, in particular, warned that the United States no
longer could expect the arid lands of the Western states to
provide profitable 160-acre homesteads.

13

Most of the remaining

Simon Greenleaf Croswell, "Should Immigration Be Re
stricted?," The North American Review, CLXIV (May, 1897),
p . 530.
14Ibid,, p. 527.
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lands, Powell declared, were certainly fertile, but could
be cultivated successfully only by means of an extensive and
expensive system of irrigation.*^

By the 1890's, Americans

had begun to listen to Powell’s words, and their realization
of the fact that much of the public domain was arid contrib
uted to the general fear aroused by the doctrine of the clos
ing frontier.
For the purposes of a single immigrant farmer--of whom
there were relatively few in the first place--much of the
frontier, then, had closed by the 1890's.

The desert and

mineral lands that remained available were of little use to
a solitary, unskilled immigrant without capital, nor were
the potentially productive irrigable lands.

There was an

agricultural frontier existing in 1890, but it was one that
required large amounts of capital, something that few immi
grants possessed.

In this respect, the restrictionists who

claimed that the closing of the public lands meant a decline
in opportunity for the immigrant were, to an extent, correct.
The writers who opposed the theory of the disappearing
frontier did not realize this fact, and, in their eagerness
to combat immigration restriction, resorted to arguments often
as irrational as those used by the restrictionists.

C. J.

Buell declared that the United States should welcome the bene
fits provided by immigrants just as a man alone on a desert

*^See, e.g., J[ohn] W[esley] Powell, ’’The Irrigable Lands
of the Arid Region,” The Century Magazine, XXXIX (March,
1890), pp. 766-776.
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island would welcome new arrivals, apparently forgetting that
a nation of some sixty million persons was not quite the same
as a man on an island.

1 f\

Edward Atkinson displayed his

ignorance of New England farmlands by claiming that immigrants
could make profitable use of the lands abandoned by earlier
Northeastern farmers, and somehow devised the notion that only
17
a few immigrants actually settled in cities.'

Atkinson,

furthermore, could not understand that it was more difficult
for a poor immigrant to purchase land from a private owner
than it was to obtain land cheaply from the federal govern
ment.

Nor

reason for

did Simon Croswell realize that aridity was a major
the low man-land ration in much of the West.

The opponents of immigration restriction argued most
effectively when they emphasized the traditional role of the
United States as an asylum for the oppressed of all nations.
That belief was yet strong in the 1880's and 1890's.

When,

however, they claimed that an abundant supply of free land
remained in the West, they were contradicting one of the
dominant fears of the era.

The fact that these opponents

believed themselves obligated to attack the frontier theme
shows how important that theme had become by the 1890's.

Many

parts of the West itself, in fact, had turned against further
immigration by the time of the depression of the 1890's, and
several Western states had closed down their immigration

■^Buell, "Immigration and the Land Question," pp. 809-810.
17Atkinson, "Incalculable Room for Immigrants," pp. 364365. John
B. Weber likewise asserted in 1892 that two-thirds
of the nation's immigrants were going west to farms! "Our
National Dumping-Ground," p. 425.
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bureaus.

18

Regardless of the dubious merits of their attacks

on immigration, Francis Amasa Walker, Richmond Mayo-Smith, and
the other spokesmen who connected the closing of the frontier
to their campaign for restriction, had devised a powerful argu
ment and one accurately designed to meet the fears of a genera
tion 'Of Americans who believed that their frontier was ending.

18

Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 73-74. For a con
temporary view, see "Immigration, Past and Present,” Review
of Reviews, III (July, 1891), pp. 571-572.
— _

CHAPTER VIII
THE VALIDITY OF THE FRONTIER THEME
Fear of the closing of the public lands, obviously, was
not the only reason for the rise of immigration restriction
in the 1880*s and 1890's, nor was it the most important rea
son,

Labor competition, dread of socialism and radicalism,

rising urban problems, and the crises of the industrial age,
were all of major importance in turning Americans against
immigration.

Even more significant was the prevalent social

and racial prejudice against the "new" immigration.

Many of

those who used the frontier argument themselves admitted as
much,

Francis Amasa Walker, for example, after one of his

lengthy discussions of the declining public domain, proceeded
to a topic that troubled him even more:

"But, in my view,

it is not in the increasing numbers which the fast-rising
tide of immigration is bringing to our shores, that the
chief danger to the republic, politically and industrially,
is found.

It is in the character of the new arrivals."^

Walker then emphasized that he did not hope to prevent
thrifty Swedes, Norwegians, and Germans from coming to the
United States, only the degraded peasants of southern and

^Walker, "Immigration," p. 130.
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eastern Europe.

2

Prescott F. Hall also showed decisively that

declining space was not his main concern:

"If immigrants be

undesirable the fact that there is land enough for many times
the population which we now have in the United States would be
generally conceded to be an inadequate reason for admitting
3

them."

The Review of Reviews agreed that the loss of the

frontier was only one aspect of the restriction movement.
The free homestead area in the United States
is practically exhausted, and the westward
agricultural migration has been carried already
beyond the safe limits of the rain-belt, with
the inevitable result of disappointment, local
distress and occasional abandonment of drouthafflicted lands. This would account in part
for the revulsion of American feeling on the
subject of immigration. But the change in the
character of immigrants affords no less weighty
a reason.^
The editorial then proceeded to condemn the recent influx of
impoverished peasants.
Racial bias, furthermore, lay behind Josiah Strong's fear
of immigration, and Strong believed that the Anglo-Saxon race
had a holy duty to spread its dominance first over the Ameri
can West, and then over the entire world.^

Even Richmond Mayo-

Smith displayed his prejudices, although he usually referred
to the blessings of Anglo-Saxon "civilization" rather than the
Anglo-Saxon "race."

^Ibid., pp. 130-141.
3
Hall, "Immigration and the Educational Test," p. 393.
^"Immigration, Past and Present," p. 572.
5See, e.g., Strong, Qur Country, pp, 144-180.
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Congress, likewise, moved toward restriction more out of
fear of the new immigration than because of the idea of the
closing frontier.

Congressional debates on the immigration

bills of the 1880’s and 189G's indicate considerable anxiety
over labor competition and the character of the new immigrants,
but show little concern with the exhaustion of the public
£
domain.
Even Henry Cabot Lodge, who had used the frontier
argument before, did not mention the idea when in 1896 he
gave his lengthy speech to the Senate on behalf of the lit
eracy test bill.

Lodge instead emphasized the manner in

which the new immigration threatened the quality of AngloSaxon citizenship.

President Cleveland gave his understand

ing of the problem in his veto message of 1897 :

"It is not

claimed, I believe, that the time has come for the further
restriction of immigration on the ground that an excess of
population overcrowds our land.

It is said, however, that
Q
the quality of recent immigration is undesirable."

See, e.g., these volumes of the Congressional Record:
XIII, pp. 5105-5113; XVI, pp. 1621-1636, 1778-1791; XXII,
pp. 2740-2741, 2945-2959; XXIX, pp. 1423-1433.
7

U.S., Congress, Senate, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., March
16, 1896, Congressional Record, XXVIII, pp. 2817-2820. See
also John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933), pp. 141-145.
8

Reprinted in Abbott, Immigration? p. 199. An 1891
Congressional report had suggested a s"imilar idea: "The time
is far in the future when we will suffer from an overcrowded
population. The territory of the United States will support
seven times our present inhabitants.
It will be fifty years
before statesmanship need apprehend a burden from the influx
of desirable aliens, but the time now is, and always will be,
when the undesirable should be prohibited a landing in our
country." U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Select
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The fact that the fear of the new immigration overshadowed
the fear of the exhaustion of the public lands, however, does
not mean, as one historian has suggested, that the immigration
restrictionists were secret racists who "dared not resort to
racist tactics and so seized on the closing of the frontier
Q
to justify laws against all newcomers."
For one thing, the
y

supporters of immigration restriction in the late nineteenth
century were not prone to deception.

They displayed their

prejudices freely and openly, and, in the context of the era
of social Darwinism, their prejudices against certain nation
alities were not considered out of the ordinary.

Ethnocentrism

was a widespread attitude in America in the 1880's and the
1890's, and there would have been no need for restrictionists
to hide their true feelings behind a smokescreen provided by
the frontier argument.

They willingly discussed both their

attitudes toward the new immigrants and their fears of the
closing of the frontier, because they sensed both sincerely,
and they found a logical connection between the two.
The leading restrictionists, moreover, were prominent,
respectable, and often worthy men who would have had no rea
son purposely to deceive the American public.

Josiah Strong

was, after all, a devout minister who firmly believed that he
spoke the truth.

He once wrote, in fact, that he thought he

was "right where God wanted me to be, and doing just the work
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House Report
3472, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1891, p. ix.
^Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, p. 110.
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He wanted me to do.”"^

Strong spent most of his life apply

ing his Christian principles to the problems of American
cities, and trying to awaken American Protestants to the
responsibilities of the urban-industrial age.

Despite his

unflattering racial biases, therefore, he must be considered
a respected and respectable man of his era, not the type
of leader who would deliberately invent an argument in which
he did not believe.
Francis A. Walker, also, despite his obvious hostility
toward the ’’stagnant pools of population” from southern and
eastern Europe, was not the type of man who had to stoop to
guile to present an anti-immigration viewpoint.

He was a

distinguished public servant, the president of a leading
educational institution, and the most renowned American eco
nomist of his era.

Richmond Mayo-Smith, as well, was a

respected academic leader, and a man who maintained an admir
able tone of rationality in his writings.

Such men would

not have invented fears about the closing of the frontier
simply to make a point; they had to have been concerned about
those fears themselves.
Finally, the fear of the exhaustion of the public lands
was one that permeated a huge number of Americans in the late
nineteenth century, not just those who opposed immigration.
The fear was a profound one, strong enough to stand on its
own; it had its own origin and its own existence, just as did

10Strong, My Religion in Everyday Life (New York, 1910),
p. 49. Quoted in Muller, Josiah Strong and the Challenge of
the City, p. 9.
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the fear of immigration.

The belief in the closing of the

frontier was by no means the source of the immigration re
striction movement of the 1880’s and 1890’s, nor was it the
only impetus behind the movement.

But many spokesmen of

the period did perceive both fears, combined the two, and,
in their own minds, believed that such a connection provided
an even more impelling reason for accelerating the campaign
for restriction of immigration.

CHAPTER IX
EPILOGUE:

LATER FEARS

Despite the fears aroused by extensive immigration, by
the exhaustion of the public lands, and by the general climate
of doubt, the United States did not enact a stringent system
of immigration control in the 1880's and 1890's.

The restric

tion laws of 1882, 1885, and 1891 were generally aimed at pro
hibiting entry only to "undesirable elements;" they were vague
and impossible to enforce.

Further Congressional attempts to

place harsher controls over immigration then subsided for a
few years after President Cleveland's veto of Lodge's literacy
test bill in 1897.
The entire restriction movement, in fact, declined con
siderably in the years immediately following the veto.

By

1899 The Nation could note that the literacy test bill and
the general demand for further controls were topics that the
country no longer discussed:

"An issue of considerable impor

tance has thus practically disappeared from our politics."^"
Such a reduction in the clamor for restriction was due, in
large measure, to the general decline in the numbers of immi-

^"The Fading Out of an Issue," The Nation, LXIX (October
19, 1899), p. 294. For a contemporary attack on the veto,
see Chetwood, Jr., "Immigration, Hard Times, and the Veto,"
pp. 788-801.
123

124
grants in the late 1890’s.

Annual immigration had begun a

downward trend in 1893, and in 1897 and 1898 immigration
reached its lowest level since 1879,

2

the ultimate result of

the worldwide depression of the 1890’s,

In 1897 the United

States Commissioner of Immigration declared that immigration
had "fallen to such small figures as to be absolutely insig3
nificant as compared with our own enormous population."
Under such circumstances, the efforts of even the most ardent
restrictionists waned.
More important to the fading of the restriction campaign,
however, was the general mood of confidence that, for a time,
returned to the United States in the late 1890’s.

As the

nation's economy revived, as labor conflict subsided briefly,
as the country began to search for overseas markets, a sense
of complacency and unity replaced tensions and doubts.
Nativism in the late nineteenth century, as always in American
history, had been a manifestation of internal unrest, and as
that unrest dissolved, hostility toward immigrants abated.^
The direct fear of the closing of the frontier subsided
as well in the late 1890's as the nation turned to a search
for new, external frontiers in the expansionistic climate of
opinion that followed the Spanish-American War.

Concentra-

^The Statistical History of the United States from Colo-'
nial Times to the Present, ppT 56 -S7 .
SSenner, "The Immigration Question," p. 6.
^Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 106-111; Higham,
"Origins of Immigration Restriction," pp. 87-88; Jones, Amer
ican Immigration, pp. 260-262,
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tion on a new frontier reduced the fears associated with the
loss of an old one, and the frontier theme never again inter
twined so closely with the cause of immigration restriction as
it did in the 1880’s and 1890's, when the anxiety created by
the loss of the public domain was so immediate and pervasive.
Hysteria against immigration, of course, eventually
reached new heights in the twentieth century, in the years
following the first World War.

That hysteria, however, re

sulted from a new set of tensions and a new lack of confidence
that developed after 1917.

Resentment .against the "new"

immigration had reappeared in the early 1900's with a new wave
of immigrants, and had commanded nationwide attention through
the forty-one-volume report of the Dillingham Commission in
1911.

But in the aftermath of World War I, even more exten

sive fears created widespread demands for restriction.

The

internal campaign for "100 per cent Americanism," fear of
German immigrants during the war, the incredible hostility
aroused by the Palmer raids and the Red Scare in the early
1920's, and the corrosive sense of disillusionment and isola
tionism that dominated postwar America, all led to the eventual
adoption of a rigid system of immigration restriction.

The

strict quota system that Congress established in the 1920's
reduced immigration to a fraction of what it had been earlier,
and eliminated much of the immigration from southern and
eastern Europe.

The nation had finally decided upon an ignoble

attempt to bolster its own confidence and sense of unity.
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The fears aroused by the closing of the frontier in the
late nineteenth century^ therefore, had been exceedingly
acute, but they had not been powerful enough to drive the
nation completely to rigid immigration restriction.

The

anxiety, caused by a belief in the exhaustion of the public
lands had provided a strong argument for restriction, and
had intensified the campaign against immigration, but it had
not been quite strong enough to carry that campaign to an
ultimate conclusion.

Only an even more disturbing group of

fears in the 1920's could do that.
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